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ABSTRACT
Prosecutors have enormous discretion in the criminal justice system.
Their decisions can ultimately impact and shape the course of the lives of the
offenders whom they prosecute.

This is certainly true for juvenile offenders

considered for transfer to the adult court.

Previous research indicates that

serious, violent offenders are the most likely to be transferred to the adult court.
However, very little is known on prosecutors’ views of the role of the juvenile
court, the process of transfer or the facts that influence their decision to transfer a
juvenile to the adult court.
A statewide survey of 800 Florida prosecutors was implemented using
factorial vignettes.

The results indicate that prosecutors support the idea of

transfer generally, particularly when they are making the final determination to
transfer to the adult court. Further, prosecutors indicate that juvenile transfer
should be used sparingly, in extreme cases that are not appropriate to the
resources of the juvenile court.
The data were also examined to determine the effect of juvenile offender
and juvenile offense characteristics on the decision to transfer a juvenile to the
adult court. Analysis revealed several significant predictors of preference for
transfer:

age, threat to society, presence of a violent offense, ethnicity of

juvenile, presence of prior adjudications, and amenability to treatment.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Discretion -- a critical element in the criminal justice process -- refers to
the use of personal decision-making and choice in situations where laws and
policies do not completely dictate a course of action. Prosecutorial discretion is
one example of this significant element of the justice system.

Ultimately,

prosecutors carry the responsibility of having an enormous influence over the
criminal justice process as well as the lives of those persons affected by the
criminal justice system.
One area of prosecutorial discretion of particular importance concerns the
recommendation and determination to exclude youthful offenders from the
juvenile justice system.

Exclusion from the juvenile justice system, also

sometimes referred to as transferring a youth to the adult court, has received a
fair amount of attention in the social science literature (Bishop, Frazier &
Henretta, 1989; Feld, 1997; Frazier, Bishop & Lanza-Kaduce, 1999; Moon,
Sundt, Cullen & Wright, 2000). Researchers, however, largely have focused on
describing the mechanisms of excluding youth from the juvenile court, outlining
the types of offenders who are excluded, and assessing the impact of exclusion.
The orientation of prosecutors and the specific process by which prosecutors
make the crucial decision to exclude juveniles has received relatively little
scholarly attention.
Due to the broad influence that prosecutors have on these youthful
offenders and the flow of justice, this discretionary decision-making process and
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the perceptions that influence and guide this process should be examined. This
research is necessary for several reasons. First, prosecutorial transfer decisions
are subject to little or no judicial review (Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 1999).

Prosecutors have a great deal of authority,

influence, and impact over the course a juvenile will take through the criminal
justice system. However, there are few safety mechanisms with which to check
and balance this authority (Klein, 1998; Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 1999).
Second, once a prosecutor has made the decision to exclude a youthful
offender from the juvenile justice system, the impact of the decision ensues.
Juveniles who are transferred to the adult criminal justice system have higher
rates of re-arrest, more serious re-arrest offenses and shorter periods of time to
new offenses compared to juveniles who remain in the juvenile justice system
(Bishop, Frazier, and Henretta, 1989). The Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (1999) reports that 54% of male and 73% of female
youthful offenders who remain under the umbrella of the juvenile justice system
will never return to the justice system. These figures are not so promising among
transferred youth. Thus, the decision to exclude a youth from juvenile court can
have a sweeping impact on the offender, the criminal justice system, and the
community into which the offenders must reintegrate after their sentence.
Due to the influence and impact that prosecutors have in the juvenile and
criminal justice systems, it is essential that a greater understanding of their
decision-making process is realized. Specifically, this research seeks to examine
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three aspects of prosecutorial exclusion of youthful offenders from the juvenile
justice system. First, I assess the impact of potentially relevant factors on the
decision to exclude youth.

Prosecutors will be presented with mock cases,

describing aspects of a youth, his or her context, and the charged offense.
Personal and professional characteristics of the prosecutors also will be
examined. Second, prosecutors’ views about their role in the transfer process
and their responsibilities will be explored. The key issues considered here will be
to what extent youth should be waived and what role prosecutors believe various
justice system actors should play in this decision. Third, I examine prosecutors’
views on the future of a separate juvenile system. By addressing these issues,
this research seeks to provide clarity and a greater understanding of the
prosecutors' decisions to exclude a juvenile from the juvenile justice system and
to prosecute those youths as adults.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter provides a thorough examination of the factors relevant to
researching juvenile exclusion from juvenile court. Several key concepts and
areas of the literature are examined. The historical, political, and ideological
environment from which the juvenile justice system was born is explored. This
frame of reference is necessary in order to ascertain how the current juvenile
justice system came into existence and currently functions, particularly with
regard to the response of government to youthful offenders.

Furthermore,

significant changes in the way juveniles are managed in the criminal justice
system are identified and discussed. The chapter reviews the system of juvenile
justice with regard to its development, its differences from the adult criminal
justice system, changes in juvenile justice in recent history, and contemporary
discussions as to the appropriate role of the juvenile court with youths accused of
serious offenses.
Youthful offenders can be transferred to the adult criminal court in a
variety of ways.

These particular methods of excluding juveniles from the

juvenile court are identified and the process through which juveniles are excluded
is detailed. The role of the prosecutor in American criminal justice is discussed,
particularly with regard to the broad discretionary power of this office.

In

particular, this section reviews the ways that prosecutorial discretion comes into
play with transfer by virtually all mechanisms. A separate section reviews what
we know about the correlates of exclusion. Based on official data, some insights
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can be gained about what types of youths are more likely to be transferred to the
adult system. Finally, the existing data concerning perceptions of juvenile justice
are reviewed. Special attention in this area is given to studies examining support
for and opposition to transfer of youthful offenders as a window into what we may
expect regarding prosecutors’ views of this practice.

The History of the Juvenile Court (1800s-1960)

Early Views of Children
The manner in which American society has responded to disobedient and
delinquent children has changed throughout history.

Various restrictions and

regulations have been implemented in efforts to control, manage, protect, and
punish children (Bernard, 1992; Binder, Geis, and Bruce, 1997). The state’s view
of children--especially regarding their level of culpability, responsibility, and
maturity--has often framed the response for delinquent behavior (Finckenauer,
1984).
Prior to the 19th century, youthful offenders were treated in the same
manner as adult offenders (Binder et al., 1997). At the turn of the century, the
perspective of children as being equal to adults with regard to culpability and
responsibility began to change. Rather than view children and adults as equal
with regard to responsibility, Puritans in colonial America began to place value on
the child and the child rearing process. Specifically, they believed that children,
while born full of sin, should be molded as productive members of a collective
family (Binder et al., 1997).
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For the Good of the Child
In the early 1800s, a rapid increase in immigration, urbanization, and
industrialization in the United States resulted in changes in the manner in which
children were viewed as well as the nature of family life. Upper-class citizens of
New York, for example, grew concerned about the increasing number of
immigrant children who were roaming the streets unsupervised.

During this

period, it was often necessary for both immigrant parents to maintain
employment in order to have enough money to provide the necessities of life in
New York.
The concerned, upper-class citizens decided that the working, immigrant
parents were not equipped to provide the supervision necessary to ensure the
proper upbringing of their children. As a result, the elitist citizens concluded that
they needed to take the initiative to provide adequate management and control of
these youth (Bernard, 1992; Platt, 1969). These upper-class citizens determined
that with their help poor, immigrant children could not only be raised properly, but
made into respectable, productive citizens (Bernard, 1992).
Thus, the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, originally
called the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism, was formed in 1817 (Bernard,
1992).

This upper-class organization was mostly concerned with the

development of a house of refuge for the poor children of the streets of New York
(Bernard, 1992). The Society’s objectives were twofold. First, they wanted to
implement a plan that would provide adequate guidance and direction for these
children. The members genuinely believed that, without adequate supervision,
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the youth were destined for misfortune (Bernard, 1992). The second goal, which
stems from the first, is far more suspect.

The members believed that poor,

immigrant children were “potential paupers” (Bernard, 1992, p. 60). A great deal
of the problems associated with rapid industrialization and urbanization were
attributed to the immigrant families moving into the city. In particular, the
members of the Society blamed poor immigrants for the deterioration and
disorder in New York City in the early 1800s. Thus, in order to alleviate the
imminent destruction of society and create a comfortable, respectable and moral
way of life, the members decided that these poor children of the streets of New
York had to be dealt with (Bernard, 1992).
As a result, the House of Refuge, the first juvenile institution, was opened
on January 1, 1825 as a means to care for the poor, immigrant children of society
who were labeled as vagrants or who had been convicted of a minor criminal
offense (Bernard, 1992). Ostensibly, the first House of Refuge was initiated for
the welfare of children, and the majority of the youths who were sent to the
House of Refuge were not criminal but poor (Bernard, 1992).
Platt (1969) observes that a “child-saving” movement began around the
middle of the 1800s.

The “child savers” maintained that it was a child’s

environment that made him or her bad or criminal (Bernard, 1992; Binder et al,
1997; Platt, 1969). Supporters of this movement argued that youthful offenders
should be handled differently than adult offenders.

The primary corrective

approach, they contended, was to be education and rehabilitation. This group
also had ulterior objectives. The ultimate objective of this movement was to
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change youth through education (Platt, 1969).

Platt (1969) notes, however,

harsh discipline was considered to be the most expedient manner in which to
achieve this goal.

The child savers were determined to instill in youth the

structure, discipline, and morals of respectable, upper-middle-class members of
society.
The children who were sentenced to the House of Refuge were sentenced
for an unspecified period of time. In general, males were confined until their
twenty-first birthday, and females were held until their eighteenth birthday
(Bernard, 1992).

These lengthy sentences were justified based on the

perception that criminality and delinquency were produced by poor parental
management and weak self-control of children (Bernard, 1992). Thus, juveniles
needed supervision until they reached adulthood. To address the mediocre child
rearing of their parents, the House of Refuge initiated strict discipline and
structure in the youths’ lives. For example, the youths who were sent to the
House of Refuge were forced to endure long hours of hard labor as well as suffer
through brutal, corporal punishment on a regular basis (Bernard, 1992).
Ultimately, the directors of the House of Refuge were attempting to change the
errant youths into moral, productive members of society.
In 1826, Boston opened its own House of Refuge, followed by
Philadelphia in 1828. The House of Refuge was an attractive policy option for
the upper-class members of urban society when faced with increasing crime
rates in their growing cities. News spread throughout the northeastern United
States about this new sanction for delinquent and potentially delinquent youth. By
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1868, over twenty houses of refuge had opened in the United States (Binder et
al., 1997), all ostensibly pursuing the goal of preventing potential youth crimes
through strict discipline and harsh punishment.
The treatment of juveniles in 19th century Houses of Refuge may seem
unduly punitive by contemporary standards, but it was based on the ostensibly
benevolent philosophy of parens patriae. Parens patriae refers to the obligation
of the government to care for a child whose parents fail to care for him or her.
The states employing houses of refuge contended that they were merely
exercising parens patriae. After all, these were minors who could not possibly be
expected to care for themselves, nor were their parents viewed as being of the
moral foundation necessary to ensure the development of a law-abiding citizen
(Binder et al., 1997). The state, acting as parent, was going to look out for the
best interests of youths in trouble.
Unfortunately, there was no regulatory system in place to ensure that a
child was being treated fairly. At this time, children were still viewed as being not
quite adults (Bernard, 1992). Consequently, children had yet to be given any
constitutional or due process protections. Thus, the poor, immigrant children of
poor, immigrant parents were vulnerable to the whims of the upper, ruling class.
These youths could be taken from their parents at any time, and there was no
legal mechanism functioning to ensure that this placement was righteous.
The case of Mary Ann Crouse in Pennsylvania clearly demonstrates the
attitude toward youth during this time period.

Crouse was committed to the

Philadelphia House of Refuge as per a petition from her mother that she could
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not manage Mary Ann (Bernard, 1992; Feld, 1999). The father filed a writ of
habeus corpus. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard this case, Ex parte
Crouse. The legal issue concerned the confinement of a person who had not
been accused or convicted of any offense. The Court rejected the father's legal
concern, ruling that the confinement was legal (Bernard, 1992; Feld, 1999).
Further, the Court said that the confinement of Crouse was for society's good as
well as Mary Ann's.
In 1870, the Illinois Supreme Court heard a habeas corpus case in the
matter of a child, Daniel O’Connell (Bernard, 1992). Daniel, like the majority of
the children in the houses of refuge, had not committed a criminal offense. The
Illinois Supreme Court ordered Daniel O’Connell to be released from the House
of Refuge because, in the court’s view, Daniel was being punished but not
helped in any meaningful way (Bernard, 1992). This decision set a precedent
recognizing that a minor child has an expectation to fundamental due process
rights (Bernard, 1992). The upper-class society’s attempt to protect their status
and class had come to an abrupt halt. It was now illegal to proactively take poor
children, who had yet to commit a crime, from their homes (Platt, 1969). Still,
child-saving reformers were steadfast in their belief in the necessity of the
removal and retraining of these youth.
The reformers and moralists of the time realized that they had to find
another means to establish social control over wayward and needy youth. They
worked tirelessly to create a social program to deal with the miseries of urban life
(Platt, 1969). As a result, in 1899, the first juvenile court was established in Cook
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County, Illinois (Bernard, 1992; Schwartz, 1989).

This juvenile court was

developed by the Illinois Juvenile Court Act labeled an Act to Regulate the
Treatment and Control of Dependent, Neglected, and Delinquent Children. This
act was quite broad and achieved the reformers’ intended goals of regaining
control of errant youth. Finckenauer (1984, pp. 115-116) identifies five motives
for the passage of this act:
1. An interest (on the part of police and other community
officials) in removing idle youths from the street, where
they might cause trouble or commit crimes.
2. A desire (especially among upper-class leaders) for ways
to remove the child from the home (particularly immigrant
homes), in order to educate and socialize the young to
accept American values.
3. A demand (by businessmen) that young people be taught
the discipline and minimal skills necessary to permit the
expanding factory system to absorb them and operate
efficiently.
4. A need (on the part of some women in the child-saving
movement) to find acceptable social and professional
roles in an industrializing, urbanizing society.
5. Perhaps least important, a concern that young people be
given the tools and education needed to earn a living
within the existing economic and social structure.
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Platt (1969) suggests that this legislation was merely a mechanism
created by the reformers to achieve their ultimate goal: suppression and control
of the underclass.

Again, the reformers had found a way to legitimize the

practice of institutionalizing children without providing them due process. This
juvenile court was to be an informal, patriarchal process. The language of the
act and the informal nature of the new juvenile court evaded the O’Connell case
and enabled the deprivation of children’s due process (Schwartz, 1989). The
legal principle of parens patriae was used as a justification for the creation of this
court, which was not a punitive, criminal court. Thus, the requirement of due
process was not applicable. The court was acting under the notion of the best
interest of the child and, as such, its actions could not technically be considered
illegal (Bernard, 1992; Schwartz, 1989). The Act was constructed to provide the
court with jurisdiction over any youth who violated a law or any poor, neglected or
abused child (Bernard, 1992).
This new alternative to achieve social change was appealing. By 1917, all
but three states had implemented some form of specialized court for dealing with
errant, delinquent and pre-delinquent youth (Schwartz, 1989). By 1925, all but
two states had implemented a juvenile court system (National Research Council
and Institute of Medicine, 2001).
These special courts continued to manage and control delinquent children
based on the court’s view of what was in the best interest of the child. Juvenile
court judges had a wide range of dispositional alternatives available to them
(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). Regardless of the
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offense committed, judges were often able to sentence juveniles to a period of
confinement until the youth reached the age of twenty-one (Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). Until the early 1960s, juveniles were
detained, often in jails, and sentenced in a manner that was sometimes more
punitive than an adult would receive for an equal offense.
Also during this time period (1920-1960), Americans were beginning to
grow concerned about the apparent rise in youth crime (Bernard, 1992; Binder et
al., 1997). As a result of the perceived crime increase, Americans were growing
concerned about how young offenders were being managed in the juvenile
courts. As public fear of crime escalated, so did criticism of the juvenile courts
throughout the country (Binder et al., 1997).
The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice (1967a; 1967b) conducted a large investigation on the practices of
juvenile courts and detention practices throughout the country. The Commission
found that juvenile delinquency was not being deterred by the then current
juvenile court practices. Rather, the Commission suggested a shift in the manner
in which juveniles were being managed and sentenced. The report implied that
the time had come to examine the philosophy that was driving the juvenile justice
system.

The

Commission

also

made

recommendations

incarceration and detention of youthful offenders.

regarding

the

Included in these

recommendations were deinstitutionalization of minor offenders, diversion or
informal intervention, and implementation of procedural safeguards for youth in
the juvenile justice system (1967b). The Commission (1967b) urged that the
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juvenile justice system develop into a two-tiered system, one system to be
dedicated to providing social services for neglected youth and children in need of
services and a social control system for punishing delinquent youth. In general,
the Commission noticed unfair and potentially unconstitutional practices
throughout the juvenile court system in the United States.

Modern Changes to the Juvenile Justice System (1960-Present)
By the 1960s, there was increasing concern among the legal community
throughout the United States regarding rights of criminal defendants. It was at
this point that child advocates began to scrutinize closely the juvenile court and
the manner in which delinquent children were being disposed (Mahoney, 1987).
While juvenile courts may have developed out of a concern for the welfare of
delinquent youths, the dispositions of these youths were often exceedingly
punitive and restrictive. Yet, juveniles were not afforded the same constitutional
protections as were their adult counterparts. Juveniles were being punished like
adults but were not afforded the same due process safeguards. Recognizing
these inconsistencies between the juvenile and adult courts, two states sought to
address the lack of due process for juveniles (Binder et al., 1997). The New York
and California state legislatures passed laws requiring due process protections
for juveniles (Bernard, 1992).
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Two-Stage Processing as Due Process
In 1960, the governor of California commissioned a study to evaluate
juvenile justice in the state. The commission found that, while the intent of the
juvenile justice system was immersed in the language of parens patriae, the spirit
of this creed was hardly being met. Rather, the study found that the juvenile
court’s procedures were inconsistent with regard to dispositions of cases, there
were little or no constitutional or procedural safeguards, and detention was
utilized to excess (Binder et al., 1997). Thus, following the governor’s study, the
state legislature passed into law the California Juvenile Court Act of 1961. This
act made certain provisions for due process for delinquent youth. Specifically,
the 1961 Act mandated a two-stage process for handling delinquent children.
The first stage consisted of an adjudicatory hearing similar to an adult criminal
trial.1 Only after the allegations had been evaluated and the youth was found to
meet a minimum level of maturity or culpability would the case move to the
second stage where the judiciary would impose sanctions.

Finally, this act

provided juveniles who were charged with felonies the right to counsel (Binder et
al., 1997).
Following California’s lead, the New York legislature passed the New York
Family Court Act of 1962. Similar to the intent of the California law, the act called
for the implementation of a statewide family court with power over all cases
involving youth in the state. This included criminal youth, neglected and abused

1

The initial hearing only required a “preponderance of evidence” standard of proof as opposed to
the adult “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard (Binder et al., 1997).
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youth, and difficult, but non-criminal youth. Like California, this act also required
a two-stage hearing process.

In addition, this act called for counsel to be

appointed for all youth brought before the family court (Binder et al., 1997).
Despite New York and California’s attempts to address due process
issues, juveniles throughout the country were still being sanctioned harsher for
their delinquent behavior than adults would have been had they committed
similar offenses. While the aforementioned acts contributed to the much needed
attention to procedural protections for youth, the United States Supreme Court
ultimately delivered the opinions which would dramatically alter the mechanisms
for disposing of delinquent cases and begin ensuring constitutional protections
for juveniles.

Landmark Supreme Court Decisions
In 1961, Morris Kent, a sixteen-year-old on probation, was arrested and
charged with housebreaking, rape, and robbery. Kent’s attorney, anticipating a
waiver from the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court jurisdiction to the criminal
system, filed a motion requesting a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction and a
request for access to Kent’s Juvenile Court Social Service file. The juvenile court
judge did not rule on these motions. Rather than responding, the judge issued
an order waiving original jurisdiction over Kent citing that he had completed a “full
investigation” as required by the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act. The
juvenile court judge never explained the details of this investigation nor did he
provide a written explanation as to the reasons why Kent was waived to the adult
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criminal court. Kent was then indicted in the adult criminal court on eight counts
involving housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Kent was tried and convicted of six
counts of housebreaking and robbery.2 He was sentenced to 5 to 15 years on
each count (30 to 90 years in prison). It should be noted that had Kent remained
in the court of original jurisdiction, he would have received no more than five
years in a juvenile correctional facility. It appears that juvenile court sanctions for
minor crimes may be more severe, but for serious crimes, the adult system can
be considerably more harsh. At this point, there seemed to be a huge gap in the
range of punishments, both for minor juvenile offenders kept in the juvenile
justice system and for serious youthful offenders considered for adult criminal
justice sanctions.
Kent’s attorney challenged the validity of the waiver to the adult criminal
court because there was not a full investigation and the refusal to provide Kent’s
juvenile court records. In 1966, the Supreme Court ruled that the juvenile court
waiver of jurisdiction was invalid. The Court held that Kent should have had
access to all pertinent records and that, minimally, the juvenile court judge should
have provided a written statement regarding the reasons for the waiver as
mandated in the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act.

Furthermore, the

Court found that the presiding judge should have conducted a hearing regarding
the decision to waive original court jurisdiction.

Specifically, Justice Fortas,

writing for the majority, offered that “appointment of counsel without affording an
opportunity for hearing on a ‘critically important’ decision is tantamount to denial
of counsel. There is no justification for the failure of the Juvenile Court to rule on
2

He was acquitted of the two counts of rape by reason of insanity.
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the motion for hearing filed by petitioner's counsel, and it was error to fail to grant
a hearing” (Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541). The Court held that while the
waiver hearing did not need to conform to the formal requirements of a criminal
trial, they must conform to the “essentials of due process and fair treatment” (383
U.S. 541).
Thus, the Court specified those due process requirements for juveniles
facing a waiver. The Court determined that Kent had been entitled to a waiver
hearing, that the hearing should have conformed to the essentials of due
process, Kent’s counsel should have had access to all court service records, and
a right to counsel itself. Finally, the Court held that the juvenile court judge
should have provided a written statement of the reasons for the waiver.
In the appendix to Kent, the Court issued explicit guidelines that the
presiding judge should consider when determining whether to waive original
juvenile court jurisdiction:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i. e., whether there is evidence upon
which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be
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determined by consultation with the United States Attorney [prosecuting
attorney]).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when
the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged
with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia [criminal
court].
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration
of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts
with the Youth Aid Division [social service agencies], other law enforcement
agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to
this Court [the court], or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the Juvenile Court. (Kent v. United States)
The Kent decision was monumental for a number of reasons. First, while
the Court’s decision only applied to the District of Columbia, states across the
nation adopted the Court’s guidelines (Bernard, 1992).

Failure to adopt the

considerations for waiver would leave other states vulnerable to appeal to the
Supreme Court. Second, this case made it clear that juvenile court cases that
reached the Supreme Court for review would be considered on a due process
basis as opposed to the standard parens patriae model (Bernard, 1992). As a
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result, greater protection for juveniles under the law began to emerge.

The

juvenile court and states’ laws regarding juvenile transfer changed with this
precedent to protect themselves from the problems associated with Kent.
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the In re Gault case.

In this

landmark case, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Gerald Gault, who was
taken into custody for making lewd telephone calls. At a subsequent hearing,
Gault was not given right to counsel, adequate notification of the charges, nor
was he able to confront and cross-examine his accusers.3 Gault’s disposition
ordered him to an institution until Gault reached the age of majority
(approximately six years).4 The Court ruled that, as a result of the blatant denial
of Gault’s constitutional right to due process, Gault had been unconstitutionally
imprisoned. Specifically, the Court maintained that the denial of due process
rights for juveniles being adjudicated was unconstitutional, particularly when the
adjudication could result in a loss of freedom. The Supreme Court ruled that a
juvenile has the right to adequate and timely notice of charges, the right to
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court had required that juveniles being
adjudicated be given some of the same procedural protections afforded to adults.
Samuel Winship, a twelve-year-old, was charged with stealing $112 from
a woman’s purse. In the subsequent juvenile disposition in New York Family

3

The woman who made the complaint never even appeared to testify during the hearing.
It should be noted that the offense in question held a maximum penalty of a $5-$50 fine or
imprisonment not to exceed two months if committed by an adult. Thus, for merely having a
status of being a child, the punishment was far more substantial. Justice Fortas, writing for the
majority, asserted that “Under the United States Constitution, the condition of being a boy does
not justify a kangaroo court” (387 U.S. 1).
4
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Court, the court determined that Winship had stolen the money.

Winship’s

lawyer maintained that he had established a reasonable doubt as to Winship’s
guilt. The judge acknowledged in the court record that he made a finding based
on the preponderance of the evidence.5 The juvenile was ordered to a juvenile
training school for a period up to six years. The legal issue in this case was
whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is included in the “essentials of due
process and fair treatment” required in juvenile court as provided by Gault.
In 1970, the Supreme Court held that the finding of guilt based on a
preponderance of the evidence was invalid.

Justice Brennan delivered the

opinion of the Court maintaining that “the constitutional safeguard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of
a delinquency proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in
Gault” (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358). Thus, the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was required in proceedings where a juvenile was charged
with an act that, if committed by an adult, would be considered a crime.
Not all landmark Supreme Court rulings have resulted in extending due
process protections for juveniles. Joseph McKeiver was charged with robbery,
larceny, and receiving stolen goods. At the beginning of his juvenile hearing,
McKeiver’s lawyer requested a jury trial.

The presiding judge refused, and

McKeiver was ultimately adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation. This
case was appealed and joined by three other similar cases where juveniles had
requested a jury trial. These cases presented “the narrow but precise issue
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment assures the right
5

This finding was based in accordance with the New York Family Court Act.

21

to trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency
proceeding” (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528). In 1971, the Supreme
Court issued its opinion maintaining jury trials are not required in juvenile
adjudications. The Court maintained that, while juvenile adjudications may have
their shortcomings, “the trial by jury in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is
not a constitutional requirement” (403 U.S. 528).
The Court cited a number of justifications for their decision. First, if the
jury trial was required as a matter of due process, the Court was concerned that
the juvenile court process would be completely adversarial, slow and public in
nature. Thus, any hope of maintaining an informal, protective environment would
be expelled. The Court held that “if the jury trial were to be injected into the
juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system
the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and,
possibly, the public trial” (403 U.S. 528).
Second, the Court maintained that the purpose of the jury in adult criminal
trials was to enhance and ensure the fact-finding process. However, there were
clearly deficits with regard to juries in the adult system. Thus, there was no
perceived enhanced fact-finding function in prescribing jury trials to juvenile court
adjudications. Conversely, the Court was concerned that the imposition of juries
on the juvenile court would weaken the juvenile court’s ability to provide
individualized justice to juveniles.

Rather, juveniles would be in a parallel

situation as adults in the criminal process. The Court was not convinced that
criminal and juvenile trials should be the same, particularly with regard to rules of
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evidence.6

The Court went on to urge for the distinction between the juvenile

and adult criminal systems. “If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process
are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its
separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but
for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it”

(McKeiver v.

Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528).7
The Supreme Court decisions have helped to shift the nature of the
juvenile court, but the Court does not seem willing to extend all due process
safeguards.

The Court appears reluctant to completely abolish the parens

patriae justification for the juvenile court.

Rather, the Court seems to be

concerned that if juries were a constitutional requirement there would be no point
in having a separate system of justice. At this point, the Court seems unwilling to
make that ultimate decision. However, the Court did suggest that legislating jury
trials for unique juvenile court proceedings would be acceptable. The Court held
that “if, in its wisdom, any state feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in
certain kinds, there appears to be no impediment to its installing a system
embracing that feature.

That, however, is that state’s privilege and not its

obligation” (McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528).

6

Of particular concern was the inclusion of the juvenile’s prior record as a matter of public record.
Justices Douglas, Black, and Marshall dissented with the Court’s opinion. They suggested that
juveniles are already being punished (as opposed to helped) in the juvenile system. As such,
they were entitled to the same due process rights as adults in criminal trials, particularly when the
youths face loss of freedom.
7
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Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
In 1968, Congress passed the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and
Control Act.

This act strongly encouraged that youth charged with status

offenses be removed from the formal juvenile court system (Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). The Act also recommended utilizing
community means rather than formal justice resources when disposing of minor
offenses (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).
Several years later, in 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDP Act) (Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 1999). This Act provided two custody requirements.
First, the act mandated deinstitutionalizaton of status offenders. Second, the Act
required that incarcerated juvenile offenders be separated from adult offenders.
Specifically, the Act directed that, when confined, juvenile offenders must be
separated from sight and sound of adult offenders. Later, in 1980, Congress
amended this Act to include the removal of juvenile offenders from adult jail
facilities.

Then, in 1992, Congress amended the Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention Act, mandating that attention be given to the
disproportionate detention of minority juveniles (Howell, 1998). Specifically, this
amendment required that States assess the nature of the problem of
disproportionate minority confinement and work to alleviate the problem (Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). To encourage compliance
with this federal act at the state level, the Act’s mandates require all states to
adhere to the provisions in order to be eligible for Formula Grants from the
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federal government (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
1999).
The juvenile court has seen great changes since its inception. Not only
has the United States Supreme Court clarified the manner in which juveniles are
to be treated in the juvenile justice system, but state and federal legislation
throughout the country also has shaped the handling of juvenile offenders.
Arguably, granting juveniles some rights has opened the door for very serious
sentencing for some youths in some states. Current sentencing guidelines in
some states extends to youths age 23 to 25.
In addition to the actions already mentioned, states have made it easier to
try juveniles as adults (Bernard, 1999; Bishop, 2000). For example, many states
have legislated offense-based, rather than individualized, offender-based waiver
requirements. Furthermore, states have altered their state juvenile court acts to
include punishment as a dispositional goal versus the traditional rehabilitation
theme (Bernard, 1999; Feld, 1998). Feld (1998) argues that despite the rhetoric
of rehabilitation, states have adopted a more punitive approach to dealing with
youthful offenders. These philosophical changes in the juvenile court often were
brought about by the perception of increasing youth crime and a perceived failure
of rehabilitative efforts (Bernard, 1999; Feld, 1997).

States now view some

youthful criminals as responsible and deserving of retribution and punishment
rather than malleable and in need of treatment or rehabilitation (Feld, 1997).
Some states have split populations into two distinct groups:

juveniles who

commit less serious (and less chronic) offenses and youth who commit serious
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(and chronic) offenses. The former receiving more rehabilitative sentences and
the latter receiving more retributive and extensive forms of punishment.
Despite these get tough responses to youth crime, a debate within the
criminal justice community as to the appropriate role and response to youth crime
remains. Are youths criminally responsible, and should they be treated similarly
to adults? Are youths criminally less responsible than their adult counterparts,
and should they be treated with a lesser degree of punitiveness? More broadly,
scholars and professionals continue to consider the question, what is the
appropriate role of the juvenile court?

What is the Appropriate Role?
As the juvenile court has moved into its second century, scholars and
practitioners are reconsidering how youthful offenders should be handled (Merlo,
2000). When considering the appropriate role and function of the juvenile court
in responding to youth crime, there are three predominant schools of thought:
abolish the juvenile court; the juvenile court should remain intact and juveniles
should not be waived to the adult criminal justice system; or retain the juvenile
court in a modified form to adhere to the original ideals and philosophy of parens
patriae recognizing that certain youths should be waived to the adult court due to
the serious nature of their offenses and the degree of risk they pose to society.
Feld (1997) is perhaps the most vocal advocate of the first position,
strongly favoring the abolishment of a separate justice system for juveniles.
While Feld (1998) recognizes the societal consensus that youths are somehow
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criminally different from adults (e.g., less responsible or culpable) and should not
receive the same sentences, he does not concede that this difference is a valid
argument for the continuation of a binary system. Rather, he advocates for the
abolition of the binary system, with the allowance that an offender’s age be used
as a mitigating factor during sentencing. In order to allow for any developmental
differences

between

youthful

and

adult

offenders,

he

suggests

the

implementation of a youth sentencing policy specifically designed to address
those needs (Feld, 1998).
This position is based generally on the argument that, because of the true
nature of the juvenile court system, a separate court does not help and may harm
youths accused of crimes. Due to the “get tough” approach to crime prevailing in
recent decades, youthful offenders are often met with retributive dispositions
rather than treatment oriented plans based on the offenders’ specific needs
(Feld, 1997). The growing practice of offense-based sentencing, as opposed to
individualized, treatment-oriented dispositions, eliminates the distinct purpose of
a separate juvenile system of justice (Feld, 1993). Furthermore, Feld (1993)
suggests that, due to the “get tough” nature of sentencing, juveniles are being
sentenced harshly but not given the same procedural and due process
protections that an adult offender would receive. Specifically, he maintains that,
in many cases, juveniles are not represented by counsel during delinquency
hearings. Sanborn (1994a) also questions the degree to which juveniles can get
an impartial hearing ensuring due process.
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While eliminating the binary system may ensure the application of due
process for all defendants in the criminal justice system, there are several
criticisms to Feld’s proposal. Rosenberg (1993) counters Feld’s criticism of due
process by suggesting that the difference between juvenile and adult court due
process is very minimal. The minor discrepancies between due process
assurances in the juvenile court and the adult court do not warrant an elimination
of the juvenile justice system. Rosenberg (1993) also notes instances where
juveniles are afforded more rights and consideration than adults. For example,
juveniles are afforded more protections with regard to confessions than are
adults. Rosenberg (1993) also suggests that abolitionists should take a closer
look at the rights actually afforded to adult criminal defendants. For example,
she notes that Miranda protections and exclusionary rule protections are
becoming increasingly narrow. As protections for adults shrink, the due process
gap between the criminal and juvenile systems is similarly diminished. Finally,
she criticizes the idealized view of the adult criminal courts. Justice is slow and
crowded in the adult criminal justice system. Most defendants plead guilty and
are hardly given individualized justice (Rosenberg, 1993). Thus, eliminating the
juvenile court would scarcely eliminate Feld’s concerns of compromised justice
for juveniles.
Another criticism of Feld’s proposition concerns the degree to which
juveniles can participate and appreciate the nature of the proceedings and take
an active and effective role in their own defense.

The entire basis for the

development of the juvenile court was the recognition that youths were not
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merely small versions of adults. Due to their young age, juveniles had yet to
accumulate the life experiences necessary to equip them physically, emotionally,
and intellectually for the criminal process (Van Vleet, 1999). If juveniles are still
viewed as being different by the mere status of their age, then surely the
abolitionists could acknowledge that those same youth are hardly intellectually,
physically, and emotionally developed to the point where they can effectively
participate and understand the proceedings in which they are involved (see
Grisso, 2000). In sum, how can youth be distinguished by age for sentencing
purposes, but assumed to possess the tools necessary to participate in their own
defense?
Redding (1999) identifies other negative consequences of the transfer of
youth to the adult criminal court.

Specifically, he identifies the legal

consequences of a felony court conviction that Feld’s proposal seems to
disregard. Juveniles convicted of a felony can lose the right to vote, lose the
right to serve in the United States military, and lose the right to possess or own
certain firearms. Furthermore, Redding (1999) observes that trying juveniles in
adult court means the juvenile’s conviction is public record, the conviction must
be reported on employment applications, and convictions could possibly be
considered for future sentencing considerations (e.g. escalating punishment
under three strikes laws).
Finally, even if it is accepted that juvenile courts fail to ensure full
procedural protections for youth, it is not clear how the adult courts would utilize
age as a mitigating factor in sentencing (Rosenberg, 1993).
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Clearly, the

suggestion to abolish the juvenile court has some serious problems.

Some

social scientists and juvenile justice practitioners not only disagree with the
suggestion but also maintain that no juveniles should be waived to the adult
criminal justice system.
This second common perspective regarding the appropriate role of the
juvenile court favors retention of a separate system of justice for all youthful
offenders. A number of arguments are put forth to support this position. The first
issue concerns the degree to which exclusion from the juvenile court adversely
affects those juveniles who are waived to the adult court. Bishop (2000) has
maintained that, with increased avenues for waiver, more juveniles will be waived
to the adult criminal justice system. For example, Puzzanchera (2000) notes that
in 1988, there were 6,700 juveniles judicially waived into the adult criminal justice
system. From 1988 to 1994, there was a 73% increase in juvenile transfers to
adult court when 11,700 juveniles were transferred in 1994 (Puzzanchera, 2000).
With a large and increasing number of youth being waived, the possible negative
effect that adult dispositions can have on juveniles is of great concern.
Several studies have found that recidivism rates of youths transferred to
the adult criminal justice system are higher than comparable youths who remain
in the juvenile court system (Bishop, Frazier, Lanza-Kaduce, and Winner, 1996;
Fagan, 1996; Winner, Lanza-Kaduce, Bishop, and Frazier, 1997). Bishop et al.
(1996), for example, found that recidivism rates for transferred juveniles were 11
percentage points higher than those for a matched sample of youths handled in
the juvenile court when they were followed for up to two years after the case was
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disposed. In a later analysis that followed these youths for seven years, the
overall recidivism rates were nearly equal (42% and 43% respectively).
Multivariate analyses, however, showed that once other factors were controlled,
transfer was associated with a slightly increased risk of recidivism. Transfer also
resulted in a shorter delay until rearrest and a higher total number of rearrests
(Winner et al., 1997).
Another concern regarding waiver of youthful offenders is the effect that
exposure to adult, career criminals may have on young, malleable youth (Bishop,
2000). Furthermore, Bishop (2000) is particularly concerned about the negative
impact of youth socializing with adult offenders, potential victimization of youthful
offenders in adult correctional facilities, and the long-term consequences that
confinement in an adult correctional facility will have on a youthful offender. For
some scholars, the appropriate response to these evident and potential
deleterious effects of transfer is that no youths should be excluded from the
juvenile justice system.
The final camp in the discussion regarding the appropriate role of the
juvenile court falls somewhere between the two previous perspectives.
Proponents of this third perspective acknowledge the problems in the juvenile
court as well as the original intention of the initial juvenile court. Further, these
advocates recognize that the juvenile court has transformed itself into a system
that no longer reflects the ideals that drove the foundation of this separate
system of justice. Van Vleet (1999) urges that abolition of the juvenile court
would fail to adequately address the needs of the majority of offenders for whom
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the juvenile system still works. Furthermore, he disagrees with the position that
no youth should be transferred to the adult court. Specifically, he advocates
excluding those youth who represent the most chronic, violent, serious youthful
offenders.
This perspective seeks to strike some balance regarding the appropriate
role of the juvenile court. It recognizes that youthful offenders, because of their
immaturity, are different from their adult counterparts, yet it takes into account
societal intolerance for serious youth crime. Proponents acknowledge that the
juvenile court has serious limitations and is not functioning in the manner in
which it was created or intended (Butts & Harrell, 1998). These practitioners and
social scientists, however, hardly encourage total elimination or inclusion of all
offenders within the juvenile court.

Rather, they view the system as having

drifted from its intended goals. The limited resources that exist must be allocated
to those youths that can still be helped.

Those youth who are no longer

amenable to treatment and rehabilitative efforts must be waived to the adult
criminal justice system in an effort to save the system and the majority of the
youth who would remain (Merlo, Benekos, and Cook, 1999; Van Vleet, 1999).

Transfer Provisions
Regardless of the debate over whether all youths, no youths or some
youths should be excluded from the juvenile court, or whether the juvenile court
should be abolished, the fact remains that a separate system exists for juveniles
and certain cases are removed to the adult criminal justice system. Precise
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figures on the number of youth transferred are not available. Rather, several
authors and agencies have painstakingly produced estimates based on partial
data. Puzzanchera (2001), for example, approximates that 8,100 youth were
judicially waived to the adult court in 1998 (the year for which the most recent
data were available). This represents a decline from 1994, when the number of
judicial transfers reached 12,100. Notably, these figures include only cases that
were excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction by a juvenile court judge. Because
juvenile cases can be removed to the adult system in several ways,
Puzzanchera’s (2001) figures represent only a portion of all cases waived. In
fact, as Bortner, Zatz, and Hawkins (2000) observe, “by 2000 the vast majority of
transfers occur through legislative exclusion” (p. 282). Thus, when all avenues of
exclusion are considered, estimates such as Bishop’s (2000) – 210,000 to
260,000 cases waived for 1996 – can be reached. To better understand how
some juveniles come under the jurisdiction of the adult court and how
prosecutors influence this practice, it is necessary to consider the various
transfer procedures available.

Overview
All states have at least one provision or mechanism for transferring
juveniles accused of a crime into the criminal system for processing as adults
(Puzzanchera, 2000). It should be noted that 31 states also have legislated
“once an adult, always an adult” (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, 1999, p. 14). This provision means that once a juvenile has been
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transferred, tried, and convicted (and sometimes sentenced) as an adult, that
juvenile must be tried as an adult for any subsequent offense that he or she
commits (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999).
Procedures to handle youthful defendants as adults go by many names:
transfer, exclusion, certification, and wavier. Regardless of the particular term
applied, these mechanisms generally fall into one of two categories:

judicial

waiver and prosecutorial waiver (Sanborn, 1994b; Griffin, Torbet, and
Szymanski, 1998).
Judicial waivers are the most commonly used form of transfer for juvenile
offenders (Klein, 1998). In comparison to other waiver provisions, commentators
argue that the judge should be the one to make the decision. Prosecutorial
provisions are often viewed as being too easy a way to transfer a youth (Bishop,
Frazier, & Henretta, 1989).
There are two general types of judicial waivers: traditional waiver and
presumptive waiver (Strom, 2000).

Traditional waivers, also referred to as

discretionary waivers, allow more discretion to juvenile court judges.8 This type
of waiver gives juvenile court judges the ability to waive juveniles to the adult
criminal justice system at their discretion.9 In 1997, laws in 47 states allowed this
form of judicial waiver (Strom, 2000).
Exclusion of youth from juvenile court jurisdiction may also occur when
judges waive youths under presumptive waiver provisions. Under this
arrangement, certain categories of juvenile offenders – defined by age, instant

8
9

It should be noted that all judicial transfer is discretionary in nature.
These type of waivers are subject to appellate review (Klein, 1998).
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offense, and past offense history – are to be waived to the adult criminal justice
system. This presumption can be overridden, however, if the juvenile can prove
that he or she is likely to be rehabilitated in the juvenile system (Strom, 2000).
In general, judicial waivers allow the judge to be the primary decisionmaker with regard to whether or not a juvenile will be tried as an adult (Klein,
1998).

The judge’s discretion, however, is constrained by legislation and is

influenced by the actions of the prosecutor.

In general, states limit waivers

based on the type of the offense, the nature of the offense (level of violence), the
age of the juvenile, and the past delinquent history of the juvenile (Klein, 1998;
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999). As noted earlier,
the 1966 Supreme Court case, Kent v. U.S., also outlined eight factors that a
judge should consider before waiving a juvenile to adult, criminal court. These
considerations include the seriousness of the alleged offense, degree of danger
that the juvenile poses to the community, whether the offense was violent and
against person(s), the level of maturity of the juvenile, previous history of juvenile
delinquency, the level of protection that should be afforded the community, and
the likelihood that the juvenile can be rehabilitated. Therefore, judges, while
maintaining a great deal of discretion, are constrained to some degree with
regard to which juveniles they can waive to adult court.10
Moreover, in practice, prosecutors play an important role in judicial waiver.
The judge’s decisions to waive juveniles into the adult court are usually initiated

10

Despite the individualized consideration given in judicial waivers, there have been considerably
more juveniles transferred to criminal court in the “get tough” era (Klein, 1998). Thus, politics
may play a grossly exaggerated role in the determination if a juvenile will be transferred or waived
to the adult, criminal court.
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by a request from the prosecutor (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, 1999). Prosecutors also decide on the offense to charge; as we
have seen, statute and case law establish the instant charge as a central
consideration in the judge’s waiver decision.
Aside from waiver through judicial discretion, youths may be excluded
from juvenile court by statute. This type of waiver excludes certain categories or
types of juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system
(Klein, 1998). Under this waiver provision, judges also are required to waive a
juvenile to the adult jurisdiction after finding probable cause for certain crimes
(Strom, 2000).

There are only 15 states that have statutes that mandate a

judicial waiver (Strom, 2000).

Still, the very jurisdiction of the juvenile court

system is a product of legislative statutes. Therefore, there is no “constitutional
right to be treated as a juvenile” (Klein, 1998, p. 383) and states have enacted
legislation establishing the adult criminal court as the court of original jurisdiction
for certain youthful defendants.

As a result of the “get tough” approach to

juvenile offenders, legislatures are rapidly increasing the scope of these statutory
exclusions.

Specifically, 37 states have some form of statute that excludes

certain juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system (Klein,
1998).
There are three factors that are typically included in statutory exclusion
provisions: age, severity of the offense the youth is currently accused of having
committed, and the criminal history of the juvenile (Klein, 1998). Notably, these
provisions are among the same factors that must be considered when
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determining judicial waivers but typically at a higher threshold for prosecutors;
youths must be older and more serious, chronic offenders. Still, the discretionary
influence of the judge is removed.

The statutes abandon the role of the

individualized judicial process and replace it with a broad exclusion of all juvenile
offenders who fall within the scope of these statutes.
prosecutorial discretion must still adhere.

Notably, however,

It is the prosecutor who decides

whether a youth should be charged with an offense specified for transfer.
Another avenue for waiving juveniles to the adult criminal justice system is
prosecutorial direct file also known as concurrent jurisdiction. In this mechanism
of juvenile waiver, the prosecutor has a great deal of discretion with regard to
which juveniles will be waived or filed in adult court (Klein, 1998).

Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutors play a powerful role in the criminal justice system. Ultimately
prosecutors must review the cases of every offender arrested by the police,
evaluate the efficiency of every pending case, determine and file charges against
defendants, and represent the state in criminal adjudications (McCoy, 1998). As
it is not feasible to prosecute every criminal case by a jury, prosecutors must
make this ultimate determination. The limits or checks to this discretionary power
are few (Davis, 1969; McCoy, 1998).
Historically, as elected officials, prosecutors were able to apply the laws of
their jurisdiction as they saw fit. State (or district) attorneys would prosecute
behaviors that met both the letter and the spirit of the law as a means of meeting
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the needs of their constituencies (Jacoby, 1997). Their decisions to prosecute
were supported by statutory provisions; yet, the decision to prosecute was not
legally reviewable (Jacoby, 1997). While judicial discretion regarding waiver is
legally reviewable, appellate courts will not extend that mandated review to
prosecuting attorneys. It has become customary and accepted that prosecutors
vigorously pursue cases that reflect societal sentiment regarding crime and
justice. In doing so, it is necessary to make decisions based upon the varying
dimensions of individual offenses and offenders.
Prosecutors’ discretionary application of the law has been extended to
juvenile exclusions. The American Prosecutors Research Institute (1996) argues
that it is wholly appropriate for the decision to exclude a youth from the juvenile
system to rest with prosecutors. In support of this position, the APRI makes the
following seven assertions:
1. Prosecutors have a responsibility to represent the state in
court on juvenile cases and therefore, should have the
right to determine what cases are filed in that court.
2. Prosecutors are unable to utilize an effective prosecution
policy or effectively implement prosecution standards
without control over the charging decision.
3. Prosecutors are trained on the legal aspects of the
charging process.
4. Prosecutors give public safety a high priority in their
decision making process.
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5. Prosecutors take into consideration the interests of the
victim and follow procedures for exchanging information
with victims.
6. Prosecutors have access to both the criminal and social
background of the juvenile.
7. Prosecutors are more easily accountable to the public
than are other individuals in the juvenile justice system.
(p. 5)
Prosecutors, of course, are often statutorily limited with regard to which
youthful offenders and which offenses they may file in adult court. Still, they
exercise considerable discretion, which some view as potentially problematic
when it comes to charging.

Opponents of this form of waiver maintain that

prosecutorial waiver is too arbitrary and may be unduly influenced by the public
and politics, leading to unfair decisions (Allen, 2000; Klein, 1998). Others, like
the APRI (1996) embrace prosecutorial transfer as efficient and acknowledge the
need to consider the particulars of each case. As Allen (2000, p. xiv) observes,
“Discretionary authority is particularly required in situations in which there is a
multiplicity of factors to be taken into account in decisions to be made, many of
which factors are peculiar to the particular case under consideration.”
Prosecutors, it should be noted, play a critical role in all mechanisms of
juvenile waiver.

The vast discretion in prosecutorial or direct file waivers is

certainly clear.

The significant influence prosecutors play in other forms of

transfer must be acknowledged. Often, a judicial waiver is initiated by a request
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from the prosecutor. Furthermore, the judiciary must detail grounds for refusing
such a request for transfer.

Prosecutors are also responsible for making

charging decisions. They must decide whether or not to seek an indictment or
file an information. They must also determine which charges (the severity of
charges) will be filed with the court. This vast discretion clearly influences how
juveniles are processed through the justice system.

The largely unchecked

discretion of prosecutors looms as a profoundly important aspect of American
justice (Schiraldi, 1999; Walker, 1993).

Florida’s Transfer Provisions
The general description of exclusion mechanisms provided above varies
to some degree from one jurisdiction to another. Because the present study
focuses on Florida, it is essential to review this state’s particulars.

Florida

statutes provide three mechanisms by which a juvenile may be waived to the
criminal justice system for prosecution. The first mechanism is voluntary waiver.
As set forth in Fla. Stat. § 985.226, a child can be transferred and certified as an
adult if the child, joined by a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, demands in
writing to be tried as an adult.
The second mechanism utilized to transfer juveniles is called involuntary
waiver. This approach is termed “involuntary” because rather than relying on the
accused juvenile to determine whether he or she wants the case heard in adult
court, cases are waived through the discretion of judges and prosecutors as
dictated by statute.

Before enumerating the remaining mechanisms it is
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important to clarify the language used in the statutes.

Florida's certification

provisions repeatedly utilize words that imply an if-then relationship, such as
must and mandatory. However, the terminology can be misleading. While the
statutes utilize these terms, they are often contradicted in the specification of the
certification method, where it becomes clear that discretion can be exercised.
As set forth in Fla. Stat. § 985.226, there are two types of involuntary
waiver: discretionary waiver and mandatory waiver. Discretionary allows the
state attorney to file a motion with the court to request the transfer of the child for
criminal prosecution if the child was 14 years of age or older at the time of the
alleged offense. This can include any offense category, but the child must be at
least 14 years of age.
Mandatory waiver occurs:
1. If the child was 14 years of age or older, and if the child
has been previously adjudicated delinquent for an act
classified as a felony, which adjudication was for the
commission of, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to
commit murder, sexual battery, aggravated assault, or
burglary with an assault or battery, and the child is
currently charged with a second or subsequent violent
crime against a person; or

2. If the child was 14 years of age or older at the time of
commission of a fourth or subsequent alleged felony
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offense and the child was previously adjudicated
delinquent or had adjudication withheld for or was found
to have committed, or to have attempted or conspired to
commit, three offenses that are felony offenses if
committed by an adult, and one or more of such felony
offenses involved the use or possession of a firearm or
violence against a person;

the state attorney shall request the court to transfer and
certify the child for prosecution as adult or shall provide
written reasons to the court for not making such request or
proceed pursuant to § 985.227(1). Upon the state attorney’s
request, the court shall either enter an order transferring the
case and certifying the case for trial as if the child were an
adult or provide written reasons for not issuing such an
order. (Fla. Stat. § 985.226)

In addition, within seven days of a petition alleging that the child has
committed an offense, but before an adjudicatory hearing and after consideration
of the recommendation of the juvenile probation officer, the state attorney may
file a motion requesting the court to transfer the youth for criminal prosecution.
This is legally defined as a discretionary provision for transfer. Once the motion
has been filed, and all parties are summoned, the court must conduct a hearing
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on the transfer motions. In making the determination to keep the case in the
juvenile court or transfer it to the adult system, the court must consider:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community
and whether the protection of the community is best
served by transferring the child for adult sanctions.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or
against property, greater weight being given to offenses
against persons, especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The probable cause as found in the report, affidavit, or
complaint.
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire
offense in one court when the child’s associates in the
alleged crime are adults or children who are to be tried
as adults.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the child.
7. The record and previous history of the child, including:
a) Previous contacts with the department, the former
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the
Department of Children and Family Services, other law
enforcement agencies, and courts;
b) Prior periods of probation;
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c) Prior adjudications that the child committed a delinquent
act or violation of law, greater weight being given if the
child has previously been found by a court to have
committed a delinquent act or violation of law involving
an offense classified as a felony or has twice previously
been found to have committed a delinquent act or
violation of law involving an offense classified as a
misdemeanor; and
d) Prior commitments to institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and
the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child, if
the child is found to have committed the alleged offense,
by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently
available to the court. (Fla. Stat. § 985.226)

The last mechanism of transfer is called direct file. “Direct file” means that
juveniles are tried as adults because the prosecutor directly files an information
in the criminal division of the circuit court (Fla. Stat. 985.227). According to
Schiraldi and Ziedenberg (2000), Florida leads the nation on this form of juvenile
transfer. They report a 7.8% increase in prosecutorial waiver from 1981 to 1987.
Schiraldi and Ziedenberg (2000) also observe that the number of youths
transferred by prosecutors to adult court in Florida nears the total number of
judicial waivers in the United States.

Given Florida’s extensive use of this
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method of exclusion, an explanation of Florida’s provisions for prosecutorial
waiver or direct file are necessary. There are two types of direct file: mandatory
direct file and discretionary direct file. Mandatory direct file provisions are set
forth in Fla. Stat. 985.227 as follows:
a) With respect to any child who was 16 or 17 years of age
at the time the alleged offense was committed, the state
attorney shall file an information if the child has been
previously adjudicated delinquent for an act classified as
a felony, which adjudication was for the commission of,
attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit murder,
sexual

battery,

armed

or

strong-armed

robbery,

carjacking, home-invasion robbery, aggravated battery,
or aggravated assault, and the child is currently charged
with a second or subsequent violent crime against a
person.
b) With respect to any child 16 or 17 years of age at the
time an offense classified as a forcible felony, as defined
in § 776.08, was committed, the state attorney shall file
an

information

if

the

child

has

previously

been

adjudicated delinquent or had adjudication withheld for
three acts classified as felonies each of which occurred
at least 45 days apart from each other. This paragraph
does not apply when the state attorney has good cause

45

to believe that exceptional circumstances exist which
preclude the just prosecution of the juvenile in adult
court.
c) The state attorney must file an information if a child,
regardless of the child’s age at the time of the alleged
offense was committed, is alleged to have committed an
act that would be a violation of law if the child were an
adult, that involves stealing a motor vehicle, including,
but not limited to, a violation of § 812.133, relating to
carjacking, or § 812.014(2)(c)6., relating to grand theft of
a motor vehicle, and while the child was in possession of
the stolen motor vehicle the child caused serious bodily
injury to or the death of a person who was not involved in
the underlying offense. For purposes of this section, the
driver and all willing passengers in the stolen motor
vehicle at the time such serious bodily injury or death is
inflicted shall also be subject to mandatory transfer to
adult court. “Stolen motor vehicle,” for the purposes of
this section, means a motor vehicle that has been the
subject of any criminal wrongful taking. For purposes of
this section, “willing passengers” means all willing
passengers who have participated in the underlying
offense.
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d) 1. With respect to any child who was 16 or 17 years of
age at the time the alleged offense was committed, the
state attorney shall file an information if the child has
been charged with committing or attempting to commit an
offense listed in § 775.087(2)(a)1.a.-q., and, during the
commission of or attempt to commit the offense, the
child:
a) Actually possessed a firearm or destructive device, as
those terms are defined in § 790.001.
b) Discharged a firearm or destructive device, as described
in § 775.087(2)(a)2.
c) Discharged a firearm or destructive device, as described
in § 775.087(2)(a)3., and as a result of the discharge,
death or great bodily harm was inflicted upon any person.

What Florida statutes term “mandatory” direct file still allows
some discretion from prosecutors – such as what offense to charge
and whether “exceptional circumstances” exist – but their decision
making is more restricted than under provisions for “discretionary”
direct file.
Discretionary direct file is waiver at the option of the
prosecutor. The statute outlines when prosecutors may exercise
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this discretion. As provided in Fla. Stat. § 985.227 directly filing a
juvenile case in adult court is allowed:
a) With respect to any child who was 14 or 15 years of age
at the time the alleged offense was committed, the state
attorney may file an information when in the state
attorney’s judgment and discretion the public interest
requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed
and when the offense charged is for the commission of,
attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit:
1. Arson;
2. Sexual battery;
3. Robbery;
4. Kidnapping;
5. Aggravated child abuse;
6. Aggravated assault;
7. Aggravated stalking;
8. Murder;
9. Manslaughter;
10. Unlawful

throwing,

placing,

or

discharging

of

a

destructive device or bomb;
11. Armed burglary in violation of § 810.02(2)(b) or specified
burglary of a dwelling or structure in violation of §
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810.02(2)(c), or burglary with an assault or battery in
violation of § 810.02(2)(a);
12. Aggravated battery;
13. Any lewd or lascivious offense committed upon or in the
presence of a person less than 16 years of age;
14. Carrying, displaying, using, threatening, or attempting to
use a weapon or firearm during the commission of a
felony;
15. Grand theft in violation of § 812.014(2)(a);
16. Possessing or discharging any weapon or firearm on
school property in violation of § 790.115;
17. Home invasion robbery;
18. Carjacking; or
19. Grand theft of a motor vehicle in violation of §
812.014(2)(c)6 or grand theft of a motor vehicle valued at
$20,000 or more in violation of § 812.014(2)(b) if the child
has a previous adjudication for grand theft of a motor
vehicle

in

violation

of

§

812.014(2)(c)6

or

§

812.014(2)(b).
b) With respect to any child who was 16 or 17 years of age
at the time the alleged offense was committed, the state
attorney may file an information when in the state
attorney’s judgment and discretion the public interest
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requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed.
However, the state attorney may not file an information
on a child charged with a misdemeanor, unless the child
has

had

at

least

two

previous

adjudications

or

adjudication withheld for delinquent acts, one of which
involved an offense classified as a felony under state
law. (Fla. Stat. § 985.227)

The plethora of offenses and offenders who are eligible for transfer to the
criminal court system demand that a greater understanding of waiver decisions
be achieved. Specifically, while the Florida statutes provide specific guidelines
framing discretion, a greater understanding is needed about the reality of how it
is exercised by prosecutors in their transfer decisions.

The power of

prosecutorial discretion was reinforced by a recent decision of the Florida
Supreme Court. In its 1998 decision in State of Florida v. J.M., the appellate
Court ruled that the criminal court had exceeded its authority when it dismissed
the prosecutor’s pre-trial petition against a minor. The decision stated that even
when the case involves a juvenile, “the state attorney possesses complete
discretion in determining whether to prosecute, which includes the authority to
continue to prosecute” (State of Florida v. J.M., a child, filed September 16,
1998).
Clearly prosecutors have a great deal of influence on which cases are
transferred for adult prosecution. However, relatively little is known about the
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factors that are most influential in prosecutors’ decisions to waive youth to the
adult court. The following section helps to frame this question by reviewing what
is known about the correlates of transfer decisions.

Correlates of Transfer Decisions
It is clear that prosecutors have vast discretion when determining the
course of potential criminal sanctions against an offender within the criminal and
juvenile justice systems.

The critical decision to charge or not charge an

offender will have an immense effect on the offender, the criminal justice system,
and society. As we have seen, prosecutors can influence whether a youth is
tried as a juvenile or as an adult even when they do not make the decision on
transfer directly. To gain insight on how this discretion is exercised, we must
consider what types of cases are excluded from juvenile jurisdictions.
Two preliminary observations about the available evidence on the
correlates of transfer will help to clarify what we know.

First, the data are

somewhat spotty, often being drawn from individual jurisdictions and disparate
time periods.

Second, and more important, often the information presented

represents indirect evidence. Rather than determining the differential probability
of being transferred for different demographic groups, some researchers present
the characteristics of those who have been transferred. Discriminatory decisions
are therefore inferred from the end result.

Despite these limitations, some

generalizations about who gets transferred and for what charges are possible.
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The key correlates of transfer have been explored and four common areas
surfaced: offense, gender, age, and race. The following sections will discuss
broadly three areas concerning these correlates. First, general patterns in who
gets transferred are identified. Second, any significant shifts in these patterns
over time are distinguished. Finally, original analyses of Florida transfer data are
presented. While other studies provide indirect evidence of decision making, the
Florida data directly assess the relationships between offense and demographic
variables and transfer.11
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the research in studies examining the
instant offense as a correlate of juvenile exclusion. Generally, personal offenses
tend to make up roughly 40-45% of the transfers to the adult criminal justice
system (Bortner, 1986; McNulty, 1995; Podkopacz & Feld, 1995; Puzzanchera,
2000; Snyder et al., 2000). Most of the remaining cases for which a youth had
been certified to the adult court involved property offenses (Bortner, 1986,
McNulty, 1995; Puzzanchera, 2000). Thus, while person or violent offenses have
emerged as the most serious offense waived, there does not appear to be a
substantial distinction between the percentage of property and person offense
cases waived to adult court.

11

These data were obtained from the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice website
(http://www.djj.state.fl.statesnresearch/0002prof/profile.html). Rates of transfer were computed
by dividing the number of youths transferred by the number of youths referred in corresponding
categories.
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Table 1.1 – Studies Examining Offense as a Correlate of Juvenile Exclusion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Offense Distribution
Study
Sample
Personal
Property
Drugs
Other

Bortner (1986)

1980-81 all transfers
In S.W. state

47%

61%

*

*

McNulty (1995)

552 transferred youth in
1994 (Arizona)

45%

39%

*

*

Podkopacz & Feld (1995)

Studied all waiver decisions
(330) btwn 1986-1992 in
Hennepin County, MN

42%

25%

*

33%

Puzzanchera (2000)

Judicial Waiver
National sample
28%
44
40

53
37
38

11
11
15

8
8
7

36

40

16

8

57

17

11

1512

1989
1994
1997
Puzzanchera (2001)

Judicial Waiver
National Sample

1998
Snyder et al. (2000)

South Carolina
All youth who waiver was
requested from 1985-1994
(595 requests)

12

This includes other person offenses, other property offenses (other than “serious”) and public order offenses. It should also be noted that of
these public order offenses, only 39% were approved for waiver. As opposed to the majority, 65-85%, being approved for other more serious
offense categories.
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Study

Sample

Personal

Snyder et al. (2000)
(continued)

Utah 1988-1995
All cases where prosecutor
requested juvenile waiver
(225 Cases)

42

46
49

Offense Distribution
Property

Drugs

Other

20

5

3313

46
25

6
22

3
4

Pennsylvania
Looked at changes in waiver
From year 1986 to year 1994.
1986
1994

Pennsyulvania
49
46
4
3 counties in 199614
(statutory exclusion)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

13

Same as S.C. 58% of all public order requests for waiver were approved.
Tracked all youth who had a prelim hearing between March 18, 1996 and December 31, 1996 and met new exclusion criteria. Tracked youth
until January 1998. Legislation concerned use of weapons during offense.
14
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Two trends in transfer across offense have emerged over the last 15 or so
years. First, juvenile exclusions for drug offenses as the most serious charging
offense have increased from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s (Puzzanchera,
2000; Snyder et al., 2000).

The increase in waiver for drug offenses is not

surprising due to the “war on drugs” as well as the emergence of zero tolerance
policies on drug use across the country. The second discernable change is in
“other” offenses being the most serious charge for juvenile exclusions.

As

represented in the studies in Table 1.1, "other offenses" generally include nonserious person and property offenses and public order offenses.

While the

representation of "other" offenses among transferred youths has remained
relatively constant nationally (Puzzanchera, 2000), some jurisdictions have
noticed a marked increase in this offense-category for waiver (Snyder et al.,
2000).

This shift may reflect legislative trends that have tended to be more

inclusive of juvenile offenders eligible for juvenile exclusion (Snyder et al., 2000).
Offense history also impacts the waiver decision. Poulos and Orchowsky
(1994) found that the most important predictor of waiver was the number of prior
adjudications that an offender had. Indicating that while the most serious offense
is a significant determinant of transfer, so too is the number of prior offenses.
Dawson (2000) provides insight into how this relationship emerges. He found
that prior offense information interacts with the seriousness of the current charge.
When the instant offense is a serious charge, prior offenses do not play a role in
the determination to transfer a youth.
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However, when the current charging

offense is not as serious, particularly for property offenses, prior record plays a
significant role in the determination to waive a youth.
General observations about the proportion of youth being waived and
changes over time are readily available in the existing data on juvenile waivers.
More difficult to ascertain is the rate or probability of transfer across the identified
variables. In order to clarify this issue, bivariate analyses were conducted on
aggregate

data

from

the

Florida

Department

of

Juvenile

Justice

(http://www.djj.state.fl.statesnresearch/0002prof/profile.html). Table 1.2, which is
based on youths processed in 2001-2002, separates the data by offense
category. Columns show the number of youth transferred to the adult court, the
percentage of transfer, the number of youth referred, and the rate of transfer.
It is important to note that upon initial inspection, Florida mirrors research
in other settings. The percentages of transfers by offense-type are consistent
with prior research both nationally and at local and state levels. Serious personal
offenses account for the largest portion of transfers, with serious property
offenses running a close second. The rate of transfer by offense-type, however,
paints a different picture of the nature of the impact of the instant offense on the
exclusion decision. For example, serious property offenses make up a large
percentage of youth excluded from juvenile court; yet, they are not the most likely
offense to be excluded. In contrast, drug offenses account for only 15% of all
excluded youths because of the relatively small number of referrals for drugs.
Taking this base into consideration reveals that drugs are the offense for which
transfer is the most likely in Florida. One in every ten youths referred for drugs in
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2001-2002 was waived to the adult court. Following close to drug offenses are
serious person offenses with a rate of transfer of 9.16%.

Table 1.2 – Florida’s Waiver By Offense (2001-2002)15
________________________________________________________________
Number
Transferred

Percent
Number
Rate
of
Referred
of
Transfers
Transfer
_____________________________________________________________________________
Serious Person
Offenses

1,344

40.4%

14,669

9.16%

Serious Property
Offenses

1,218

36.6%

21,811

5.58%

Drug Offenses

514

15.4%

5,133

10.01%

Other Offenses

251

7.5%

6,896

3.64%

When gender is examined as a correlate of waiver decisions, findings
across studies are highly consistent. Males are considerably more likely to be
requested for waiver, and they are waived more often than females (Bishop,
Frazier, and Henretta, 1989; Bortner, 1986; Puzzanchera, 2000; Snyder et al.,
2000). Bortner (1986) looked at all waived youths in a county in a southwestern
state. She found that nearly 97% of those youths were male. Similarly, Bishop,
Frazier and Henretta (1989) report that 92% of direct file cases from 1981 to
15

For the purposes of this analysis, “serious person offenses included murder/manslaughter,
attempted murder, sexual battery, other felony sexual offenses, armed robbery, other robbery,
and aggravated assault/battery. “Serious property offenses” includes arson, burglary, auto theft,
and grand larceny. “Drug offenses” include felony non-marijuana drug and marijuana felony.
“Other offenses” include receiving stolen property, concealed weapon, forgery, escape, resisting
arrest with violence, shooting/throwing missiles, felony traffic offenses, and other felony.
Misdemeanor offenses utilized as the most serious offense for exclusion were not included in this
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1984 in Florida involved male youths. Nationally, Puzzanchera (2000) found that
95% of all juvenile waivers involved males. Snyder et al. (2000) found similar
rates of males represented among youths waived in South Carolina, Utah, and
Pennsylvania (95%, 96%, and 99%, respectively).

Notably, they found a

decrease in female waiver from 1986 to 1994 in Pennsylvania. In 1986, female
offenders made up four percent of the waived youths.

In 1994, they only

constituted one percent of the youths transferred to the adult court.
Clearly, there are more male than female youths being transferred to the
adult court.

However, the existing research merely reports the gender

distribution of cases already waived. To gain a better understanding of the true
nature of the effect of gender on transfer decisions, the rate of waiver by gender
must be ascertained. Looking at Table 1.3, we gain a better understanding of the
impact of gender on waiver. In 2001-2002, 93.5% of all transfers in Florida were
male. So, among those transferred, males outnumber females 14 to 1, but the
rate at which males are transferred is only about 5 times that of females. Thus,
when the substantially larger number of male youths referred is taken into
account (110,413 versus 39,245 female referrals), the disparity between males
and females transferred is much smaller than what the distribution of transferred
cases indicates. Florida’s data suggest that sex does have an effect on the
waiver decision, although we still have to consider the possibility that the sex
effect can be explained away by offense or something else.

analysis, nor were other non-serious “other” offenses as categorized by Florida Department of
Juvenile Justice due to the relatively small number of cases.
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Table 1.3 – Florida’s Waiver By Gender (2001-2002)

Number
Transferred

Percent
Number
Rate
of
Referred
of
Transfers
Transfer
_____________________________________________________________________________
MALE
FEMALE

3,489

93.5%

110,413

3.160%

243

6.5%

39,245

0.619%

A youth's age also seems to figure prominently in decisions to exclude.
The results from prior studies are consistent: older youths are waived more often
than youger youths. Puzzanchera (2000) found that, nationally, the vast majority
of youth waived to adult court were 16 or older (87% in 1997). Research on
individual jurisdictions parallels Puzzanchera’s national figures. Generally, most
youths transferred to the adult system are 16 or 17 years old

(Kinder,

Veneziano, Fichter and Azuma, 1995; McNulty, 1996; Poulos and Orchowsky,
1994; Snyder et al., 2000).
While the majority of youth transferred are 16 or older, there has been a
slight increase in the representation of youth under 16 years of age among those
waived to the adult court. Puzzanchera (2000) reports national figures showing
that, in 1988, 93% of all juveniles waived to the adult courts were 16 or older. By
1997, waived juveniles 16 or older accounted for only 87% of cases. Frazier et
al. (1999) reported a similar pattern in Florida. With the authorization of direct
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file in 199416, the number of youths age 14 and 15 transferred increased between
1992-1993 and 1995-1996 from 731 youths to 921 youths.17 Similarly,
Pennsylvania saw an increase in younger youths waived as a result of their
legislative reforms. The number of youth 15 or younger waived to the adult court
increased from 10% in 1986 to 20% in 1994 (Snyder et al., 2000).
Turning to analysis of Florida data, an overwhelming majority of the youths
waived to the adult court in 2001-2002 were 16 or older. Almost none were
under 14 years old. The rate of transfer also follows this pattern (see Table 1.4).
Older youths are considerably more likely to be transferred than are younger
youths.

Table 1.4 – Florida’s Waiver By Age (2001-2002)
Number
Transferred

Percent
of
Transfers

Number
Referred

Rate
of
Transfer

AGE
0-9

0

0%

1,606

0.00%

10

0

0%

1,517

0.00%

11

0

0%

3,459

0.00%

12

3

0.08%

7,793

0.04%

13

11

0.29%

14,066

0.08%

14

104

2.27%

21,367

0.49%

15

250

6.69%

28,126

0.89%

16

1,068

28.62%

33,315

3.20%

16

Known as the Juvenile Justice Reform Act, these 1994 reforms made several changes to the
mechanism of transfer for youth, including direct file for 14 and 15 year old youths charged with a
range of person or property offenses.
17
The rate of transfer went from 2.6% in 1992-1993 to 2.7% in 1994-1996. Yet in 1996-1997, the
rate of transfer for youths 14 and 15 decreased to 2.2%.
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AGE
17
18+

Number
Transferred

Percent
of
Transfers

Number
Referred

Rate
of
Transfer

2,090

56.00%

35,100

5.95%

206

5.52%

3,309

6.23%

Race, above all the other characteristics of waived and waive requested
youthful defendants, has been at the heart of most research and debate about
certification of juveniles. The issue of race as a correlate of transfer is not as
uncomplicated as offense, gender and age as correlates. Rather, explaining the
effects of race on criminal justice outcomes is complex (see Bortner et al., 2000).
Typically, the research on race and juvenile justice decision-making suffers from
two primary flaws.

First, the research often examines race as a black-white

dichotomy and does not attend to other races or ethnicities. In some studies,
Latinos, American Indians, and Asian/Pacific Islanders are simply excluded from
analysis. The research that does attempt to make a distinction between race and
ethnicity also falls short. Latinos and American Indians may be included within
the analysis, but are classified as white (Bortner et al., 2000).
Second, findings and discussions regarding race tend to oversimplify the
relationship. Specifically, looking at race and its effects in the justice system
does not typically include a more salient aspect of this dimension – social
classifications or status. While identifying race and ethnicity are often plausible
for researchers, data on the social status of an offender, particularly a juvenile
offender, is not readily available (Bortner et al., 2000). As a consequence, the
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possible intercorrelation of race and social status is largely ignored. Discussions
and implications regarding racial biases within the system, therefore, can be
misleading. These limitations must be considered when examining the existing
literature on the nature of race and juvenile transfer.
Table 1.5 identifies the research regarding race and transfer. Several
general observations can be made. Nationally, whites represent a little over half
of all youth waived (Puzzanchera, 2000). Blacks represent a little less than half
of those transferred. While the national pattern is somewhat clear, the findings
do not differentiate by ethnicity. Moving away from national data, the issue of
race becomes more fragmented.

Research that focuses on more specific

geographic areas paints quite a different picture of the demographics of waived
youth. For example, Thomas and Bilchick (1985) looked at 844 waived youth in
Dade County, Florida, through direct file and judicial waiver. They found that
67% of waived youth were non-white. In South Carolina, blacks represented
80% of youth requested for waiver between 1985 and 1994 (Snyder et al., 2000).
In Utah between 1988 and 1995, whites made up 57% percent of all youth
requested for transfer (Snyder et al., 2000).

More telling, blacks only

represented 5%; while, Hispanic and “other” youth made up 37%. At least in
Utah, it is important to distinguish Hispanic youths from black and white youths.
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Table 1.5 - Studies Examining Race and Ethnicity as Correlates of Juvenile Exclusion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Race Distribution
Study
Sample
White
Black
Hispanic
Other

Thomas and Bilchick (1985)

844 waived youth;
Dade County, FL
Direct file and judicial waiver

Bortner (1986)

1980-81 all transfers
In AZ county (214 waived
Youth) judicial waiver

Barnes & Franz (1989)

52.2%

23.5%

NC County (1978-83)
206 considered for waiver
through judicial waiver

Podkopacz & Feld (1995)

Studied all waiver decisions
(330) between 1986-1992 in
Hennepin County, MN
Judicial Waiver

Puzzanchera (2000)

Judicial Waiver
National sample

1988
1994
1997

67% non-white18

20.6% (Mexican)

3.5%

55% black or Hispanic considered unfit
for juvenile court

28%

55%

17%

55%
48%
50%

43%
48%
46%

2%
4%
4%

18

Note S.W. State demographics. Large Hispanic population, depending on the county (more southern) will have larger numbers of Hispanic
residents.
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Race Distribution
Study
Sample
White
Black
Hispanic
Other

Puzzanchera (2001)

Judicial Waiver
National Sample

1998

55%

42%

3%
1%

Snyder et al. (2000)

South Carolina
All youth who waiver was
requested from 1985-1994
(595 requests)

20%

80%

Snyder et al. (2000)

Utah 1988-1995
All cases where prosecutor
requested juvenile waiver
(225 Cases)

57%

5%

27%

10%

Snyder et al. (2000)

Pennsylvania
Looked at changes in waiver
From year 1986 to year 1994.
38%
28%

50%
60%

12%
10%

3%
4%

1986
1994
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Race Distribution
Study
Sample
White
Black
Hispanic
Other

Snyder et al. (2000)

81%19

Pennysylvania
3 counties in 199620

(statutory exclusion)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

19

This study looked at juveniles excluded based on new legislation regarding weapons used during the commission of the instant offense.
Researchers only reported the percentage of blacks being excluded.
20
Tracked all youth who had a prelim hearing between March 18, 1996 and December 31, 1996 and met new exclusion criteria. Tracked youth
until January 1998.
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Looking at changes over time, it appears that blacks are a growing portion
of excluded youths. Puzzanchera (2000) found that blacks represented 43% of
waivers in 1988 and increased to 46% of the waivers in 1997 nationally. Snyder
et al. (2000) found similar results in Pennsylvania. From 1986 to 1994 blacks
went from 50% of juveniles waived to 60% of waived youth.
Table 1.6 shows the original analysis of Florida data.

In terms of all

youths transferred, blacks made up nearly 57% of the transferred youth in Florida
between 2001-2002. This figure is fairly consistent with many of the studies
shown in Table 1.5. More telling is the rate of transfer by ethnicity (see Table
1.6).

Not only are blacks -- at a rate of nearly 3.5% -- more likely to be

transferred to the adult court than whites, but all other ethnicities in Florida are
more likely to be transferred than are whites.

Table 1.6 – Florida’s Waiver By Race (2001-2002)

Number
Transferred

Percent
Number
Rate
of
Referred
of
Transfers
Transfer
_____________________________________________________________________________
White
Black
Asian
Other21

1,606
2,103
15
8

43.03%
56.35%
0.40%
0.21%

87,620
61,221
525
292

1.83%
3.44%
2.86%
2.74%

In summary, the existing research on the correlates of juvenile exclusion
suggest that transfer is more likely for youths who are older, black or hispanic, or
male and for those who have prior offenses or are currently facing charges for

66

drug or serious personal crimes. Two aspects of the aforementioned studies,
however, should be noted. First, the relationship between race and transfer has
often been explained away by other factors such as prior offenses and age
(Poulos and Orchowsky, 1994), current offense type (Podkopacz and Feld,
1996), and prosecutor's emphasis on violent crime (Podkopacz and Feld, 1995).
Second, all of the studies reviewed have relied on official data. Thus, they are
restricted in the types of variables they can examine and in how the
characteristics of interest are operationalized. As Applegate et al. (2000) have
observed, the salient considerations influencing juvenile justice decision-making
frequently are missing from or are operationalized poorly in official data (also see
Sanborn, 1996).
While there are some striking results regarding race and gender,
particularly in Florida, the geographic location for the current study, conclusions
regarding these findings should be drawn cautiously. Disparity does not
necessitate discrimination. The interactions between race or gender and other
dimensions of this issue may not be readily available or were not considered in
past studies. The determinants of juvenile waiver, particularly regarding extralegal variables need to be further explored using other data sources.

Views of Juvenile Transfer
The discussions reviewed earlier demonstrate some facts essential to
framing the current study. Waiver may occur in several ways, alternative visions
for the future of juvenile justice have been offered, and we know some of the
21

“Other” includes Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, and Other (not defined in data provided).
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correlates of decisions. As scholars and professionals weigh possible changes
to the way serious juvenile offenders are treated, a central concern is the policy
space that exists for alternatives. The degree of support for or opposition to
transferring juveniles to adult court can constrain policy choices. It is also likely
that the correlates of transfer may reflect professional sentiments. It, therefore, is
essential to consider what views are held regarding this issue.
Broadly, this discussion is divided into two parts. First, this section will
review available research on the public’s perception of the juvenile court,
sanctioning of youthful offenders, and juvenile exclusion. Second, practitioners’
views will be examined regarding the issue of transfer. Although public attitudes
are not the focus of the current research, they are relevant in two ways. Because
prosecutors ostensibly represent "the people," broadly construed, public
preference may help shape their decisions.

Also, the available research on

practitioners' opinions on juvenile exclusion is extremely sparse.

Reviewing

studies of the public, therefore, helps to flesh out what we may expect in
assessing prosecutors.

Public Perceptions of Juvenile Exclusion
Consensus theory contends that criminal justice policies generally reflect
commonly held societal views about how to deal with offenders. As noted in
previous discussions, the philosophy of the juvenile court has undergone several
shifts or changes. Recent legislation tends to reflect a more punitive response
toward youthful offenders. However, most of these legislative efforts are geared
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toward serious, violent youthful offenders. According to consensus theory, public
attitudes regarding youth crime would mirror these initiatives.
Table 1.7 depicts the salient research in public attitudes toward
certification of youthful offenders to the adult criminal justice system. Based on
the review of this literature, several findings emerge. First, in general, the public
supports transferring serious, youthful offenders to the adult criminal justice
system (King-Davis, Applegate, & Cullen, 2003; Sprott, 1998). The research
findings indicate that people support transferring youth when given global
questions or statements about transferring serious, youthful offenders.
Using a nationally representative sample, for example, Triplett (1996)
looked at public support for waiver of juvenile offenders to the adult criminal
justice system. An overwhelming majority of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed that youths charged with a serious property crime, serious drug crime, or
serious violent crime should be tried as adults (62%, 69%, and 87%,
respectively). The response to these offenders tends to indicate that the public is
still in a “get tough” mentality and has relatively little patience with certain
categories of offenders.
Second, the level of support varies depending on the type of offense
presented to the respondent. Public support for transfer is highest for serious,
violent offenses. Selling large quantities of drugs and property offenses tend to
elicit somewhat lower levels of preference for exclusion (Bouley and Wells, 2001;
Mears, 2001; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs, 1993; Triplett, 1996;
Wu, 2000). Thus, the public is generally quite supportive of transfer and the level
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of support for transfer is related to the type of offense presented to the
respondent.
Third, some distinction can be made between public views on trying
youths as adults and punishing youths as adults. The salience of separating
these issues is raised by Feld's (1992) assertion that youths should be tried by
the adult system but their age should result in mitigated sentences.

The

evidence on public preferences is equivocal.
Sprott (1998) investigated Canadian public opinion regarding transfer of
juveniles to the adult criminal justice system and the degree to which the public
supported a separate youth system.22 Sixty-eight percent of her respondents
were opposed to a separate court for juvenile justice. Of those who opposed the
separate system, nearly 94 percent maintained that the current juvenile court
dispositions were not as harsh as they needed to be. Those who opposed the
separate juvenile court system believed that juvenile sanctions should be similar
to adult sanctions. That is, they maintained that the punishment should fit the
crime irrespective of age.

Generally, they believed that youth should be

sentenced like adults. However, the support for more severe treatment of youth
crime did not extend far beyond this point. There was little support for sentencing
youth with adults.
In contrast, Schwartz's (1992) analysis revealed little support for
sentencing juveniles as adults or to adult prisons. More broadly, Moon, Sundt,
Cullen, and Wright (2000) sought to develop a better understanding of the

22

Canada has similar transfer provisions to the United States regarding certification of juveniles
to the adult criminal justice system.
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degree to which the public perceives juveniles as being distinct from adults and
deserving distinct treatment from the justice system. Mail-out surveys were sent
to 1,500 people in Tennessee with 539 usable surveys being returned. Almost
two-thirds of the respondents indicated that they believed the goal of imprisoning
juveniles is rehabilitation. This ideology is indicative of the individualized
adjudication intended in the inception of the juvenile justice system.

Yet,

respondents were also quite supportive of punitive or just deserts oriented
approaches to youthful offenders.

There was little support for incarcerating

juveniles for long periods of time without some underlying rehabilitative purpose;
suggesting that, while the public supports punitive treatment of youthful
offenders, they seem to view most youth as being distinct from adult offenders.
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Table 1.7 – Public Views of Juvenile Exclusion

Study

Question Asked23

% Favoring Transfer

King-Davis et al. (2003)

Juveniles who commit violent crimes should be tried as adults

73.2%

Scenarios describing specific youthful offender with varied
attributes. Should case should be handled in juvenile or
adult court?

40.3%

Bouley & Wells (2001)

Wu (2000)

Schwartz (1992)

23

Should juveniles who commit the following crimes
be tried as adults:
Serious property crime

64.8%

Violent offenses

71.3%

Selling illegal drugs

90.0%

“Juvenile tried as adult for property crime”

68.3%

“Juvenile tried as adult for drug crime”

73.5%

“Juveniles tried as adult for violent crime”

90.8%

How should juveniles who commit X be handled:
Serious property crimes

almost 50%

Selling large amounts of drugs

62%

Some questions asked have been paraphrased. Exact questions are in quotations.

72

Study

Question Asked

% Favoring Transfer

Serious violent crimes

68%

Juveniles found guilty of committing X crime should be
punished:

Schwartz, Guo, Kerbs (1993)

Schiraldi & Soler (1998)

Serious property crimes

97%

Selling large amounts of drugs

97%

Serious violent crimes

99%

Do you strongly agree or strongly disagree to trying juveniles
in adult court?
Serious violent crimes (Part I violent crimes)

67%

Part I property crimes

50%

Sale of illicit drugs in large quantity

62%

“Current law gives federal judges the authority to decide whether
a juvenile will be prosecuted in juvenile or adult criminal court.
This bill would give federal prosecutors total discretion, not
subject to review by a federal judge, to try juveniles as adults
for all felonies. Would you agree strongly, agree somewhat,
disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly that federal prosecutors
should have total discretion to try juveniles as adults for all
felonies?”

41%
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Study

Question Asked

Sprott (1998)
Ontario, Canada

“Do you think that young persons charged with criminal offenses
should continue to be handled in a separate youth justice
system, or do you think that they should be dealt with in the adult
justice system?”

Triplett (1996)

Mears (2001)

% Favoring Transfer

64% oppose
separate system

“Tell me for each of the following statements whether you
strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree,
or strongly disagree:”
“A juvenile charged with a serious property crime should be tried
as an adult”

62%

“A juvenile charged with selling illegal drugs should be tried as an
adult”

69%

“A juvenile charged with a serious violent crime should be tried as
an adult”

87%

“Juveniles should be tried as adults if charged with”
Selling illegal drugs

70%

Committing a property crime

64%

Committing a violent crime

87%

Stalans and Henry (1994)
Specific scenarios varying homicide-offender characteristics
25-76.4%
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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In the abstract, the public wants violent youthful offenders to be tried as
adults.

Closer inspection of the available data, however, yields variation on

support for juvenile exclusion. While this type of research is hardly exhaustive,
several studies have identified the ways people’s attitudes vary and variables
correlated with the degree of support for juvenile exclusion.
The extant research was examined to identify how the demographics of
youthful offenders may affect public support of waiver.

Schwartz (1992)

examined the degree to which the public varied in support for trying youth as
adults across age. The question posed was: “At what age do you think a person
accused of a crime should be brought before an adult criminal court rather than a
juvenile court?” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 222). Support for excluding youth who were
fifteen or younger was 16 percent. Youths sixteen and older accused of a crime
received 84 percent support for transfer. Stalans and Henry (1994) reported
similar results.

For both first-time and repeat offenders, respondents were

significantly more likely to recommend adult court for 16-year-old youth than for
14-year-old youth. King-Davis et al. (2003) did not find significant differences in
preferences for transfer by age, but exclusion was endorsed more strongly for
youths who were perceived as more mature. Relatedly, Moon, Wright, Cullen,
and Pealer (2000) looked at support for the death penalty for youthful offenders;
the ultimate juvenile certification. They found that the public who supports capital
punishment are generally willing to sentence relatively young offenders to death.
For example, they found that nearly 25% of capital punishment supporters did
not think there should be a minimum age to sentence a youth to death. Almost
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half (43.8%) supported capital punishment for twelve-year-olds, and an
overwhelming 85.6% of those who favored the death penalty for at least some
juveniles supported capital punishment for youths aged sixteen and older.
The juvenile's age is not the only factor that has been examined. The
more exhaustive research on how offender characteristics affect support of
juvenile waiver was done in Georgia with randomly selected adult residents
through telephone interviews.

Stalans and Henry (1994) conducted a study

examining effects of offender and offense characteristics on support for transfer.
They found that prior convictions of the youth were significantly related to support
for recommending adult court for youth charged with a killing. Youths with two
relatively serious prior convictions (a conviction of theft and a conviction of
breaking an arm of another teenager) received significantly more support for
waiver. Past abuse of the youthful offenders was also significant in predicting
support for transfer. Respondents were significantly more supportive of transfer
to the adult court for both first-time offenders and youth with prior convictions
who were not abused as compared to the same youth who had a history of
abuse.

Stalans and Henry (1994) suggest that their findings are contrary to

certain provisions of juvenile certification. The researchers suggests that this is
one example of how legislative provisions are contrary to public sentiment.
The above research demonstrates that variations in the youthful offender’s
characteristics influence support of waiver. Other research has examined the
extent to which the respondent’s demographics influence support of juvenile
transfer. Table 1.8 presents the extant research in this area.
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Table 1.8 – Respondent Demographic Correlates of Public Views of Juvenile Exclusion

Study

Male

White

Age

Conservative

Married

Education

Income

Fear
Of
Crime

Have
Children

Schwartz,
Guo, and Kerbs
(1993)
Drugs
Property
Violent

+
+
0

0
0
0

0
+
0

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

0

NA
NA
NA

+
+
+

0
0
0

Bouley and
Wells (2001)
Drugs
Property
Violent

0
0
0

0
0
+

0
0
0

NA
NA
NA

0
0

0
0
0

0
0

0
0
0

NA
NA
NA

Triplett (1996)
Drugs
Property
Violent

0
0
0

0
0
0

+
0
0

+
0
0

NA
NA
NA

0
0
0

0
0
0

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

Wu (2000)
Drugs
Property
Violent

0
+
0

0
0
0

+
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

NA
NA
NA
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Study

Male

White

Age

Conservative

Married

Education

Income

Fear
Of
Crime

Have
Children

King-Davis et al.
(2003)

+

0

0

+

NA

0

NA

NA

-

Mears (2001)
Drugs
Property
Violent

0
+
0

0
0
0

0
+
0

0
0
0

+
+
+

-

+
0
0

NA
NA
NA

0
0
0

+ = positively related
- = negatively related
NA = not examined
0 = not related
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The majority of the research in this area has found that demographics of
respondents and support for transfer are unrelated. The public's characteristics
addressed in this area of research are respondent gender, race, age, political
affiliation, marital status, level of education, income, fear of crime, and having
children. Male respondents are much more likely than female respondents to
support transfer of youth to the adult court, particularly for property offenders
(King-Davis et al., 2003; Mears, 2001; Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs, 1993; Wu,
2000). The race of the respondent was significantly related to support of transfer
in only one identified study; whites were more favorable toward exclusion (Bouley
and Wells, 2001).

Older members of society tend to be more supportive of

transfer of drug offenders (Triplett, 1996; Wu, 2000).

Mears (2001) and

Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs (1993) also report a positive relationship between age
and support for transferring property offenders. Political ideology was found to
be significant in predicting support of waiver in two studies (King-Davis et al.,
2003; Triplett, 1996). Findings regarding martial status were not as consistent
across these studies. Mears (2001) found that people who were married were
significantly more likely to support waiver than those who were unwed. However,
Bouley and Wells (2001) found a negative relationship between being married
and support for waiver for drug offenders. Level of education also tends to be
negatively related to support for transfer. Less educated members of the public
are more supportive of waiver of youth than people with higher levels of
education. Finally, having children yielded no significant predictions of support
for juvenile waiver. Although not entirely consistent, the findings suggest that
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people who are older, single, less educated, non-minority, and male hold more
favorable views toward transferring juveniles.
Several common conclusions can be drawn from the research on public
opinion toward juvenile justice issues.
punishment must be served.

There is an underlying sense that

Furthermore, it seems apparent that citizens

typically favor juveniles being waived to the adult court for particularly serious
offenses. Even for juveniles accused of serious offenses, however, the public
acknowledges differences between youths and adults.

The public has not

become so disenchanted with the idea of malleability as to demand the same
punishments for juveniles as for adults.

Practitioners’ Views of Juvenile Waiver
The previous section examined the public’s view of juvenile certification to
the adult court. In an effort to better understand current and future directions of
the juvenile court and the appropriate role of juvenile waiver, scholars have
examined practitioners’ views of juvenile justice.

Only a few studies have

examined specific approaches and decision-making by juvenile justice
practitioners in an effort to better understand the ideology of those practitioners
as well as how those ideologies impact dispositions of youth. Applegate, Turner,
Sanborn, Latessa, and Moon (2000) mailed questionnaires to 106 juvenile court
judges in Ohio in an effort to determine the characteristics of a juvenile court
case that has the most impact on the judge’s decision to commit an offender to a
state facility. Specifically, the authors sought to determine whether judges use
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social as well as legal factors when making commitment decisions. Sixty-five
percent (N = 69) of the judges participated in the study. The respondents were
provided with a factorial vignette and asked to indicate how likely it was that they
would commit the juvenile offender to a state facility on a scale of zero to 100
percent.
Analysis indicated that several legal and social factors are significant in
explaining the decision to commit a youth to a state facility. The legal factors that
influenced the judges’ decision to commit included the seriousness of the
offense, measured by both the degree of felony and harm caused to or loss
suffered by the victim, whether or not the youth had a prior felony on his or her
record, and the number of times the youth had been adjudicated prior to the
current offense. The social factors that were predictors of commitment were the
age of the youth (older youth being more likely to be committed) and whether
families were willing to participate and cooperate with the court. Although the
decision to commit a youth is distinct from the decision to transfer, Applegate et
al. (2000) asserted that the dominance of legal factors in explaining judges’
decisions suggests an orientation closer to the adult criminal justice system than
the parens patriae guided juvenile system envisioned at the turn of the 20th
century.
The above study implies that practitioners may support handling at least
some youthful offenders as adults.

A more direct assessment, however, is

necessary before such a conclusion is warranted. Bishop, Frazier, and Henretta
(1989) conducted telephoned interviews with the key prosecutor in charge of
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transfer policy in each of Florida's judicial districts. Their research focused on
several attitudes toward the juvenile justice system, perspectives on avenues of
juvenile certification, why youth are certified, and why youth are not certified.
The majority of the prosecutors, as indicated through close-ended questions,
thought that transfer provisions were adequate. However, through open-ended
questions, half thought the law should have been more far-reaching, particularly
with regard to the ability to certify youth younger than 16 years of age. The other
half of respondents were concerned that too much discretion might open the door
for instances of abuse. Specifically, prosecutors opposed to greater expansion in
juvenile certification criteria were concerned that less ethical prosecutors may
use the direct-file provision inappropriately. The reason for this concern was the
lack of formal standards concerning direct-file.24

A slight majority of the

respondents supported the principles of the juvenile justice system, while the
remainder expressed disdain for a separate youth system. Virtually all of the
prosecutors, regardless of their opinion regarding the juvenile justice system,
reported an increase in juvenile certification after the change in law enacting
direct-file provisions.
Prosecutors were also asked to cite the criteria used for determining
whether to file in criminal court. All respondents indicated a large emphasis on
two variables: seriousness of the offense and a youth's prior adjudications of
delinquency. Age of the youth was also cited as figuring heavily into the transfer
decision. In Florida, the juvenile court jurisdiction over most youthful offenders

24

Bishop et al. (1989) note that only one jurisdiction (Miami-Dade County) has formal policies
concerning juvenile certification through direct-file provisions.
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ends at age 19. Prosecutors indicated a propensity to transfer youths who were
close to their 18th birthdays, because they were uncomfortable with the brief
jurisdiction the system would have otherwise.

Prosecutors also indicated an

inclination to file charges in the criminal court when, during the commission of the
crime, the youth was accompanied by an adult accomplice.

To these

respondents, the presence of an adult accomplice indicated that the youth was
more mature and criminally sophisticated.

Finally, prosecutors indicated that

once a transfer decision had been made on one youth, for severity of offense or
prior record, any juvenile accomplices also would be seriously considered for
transfer to ensure equitable treatment.
Prosecutors were then asked to indicate reasons for making the decision
not to transfer a youth to criminal court.

Prosecutors indicated that "boyish"

youth or young defendants are not good candidates (Bishop et al., 1989, p. 189).
They reasoned that acquittal of such defendants was probable in the adult
system due to juror biases.
The only other study specifically on the issue of professionals’ views of
excluding youth from the juvenile court is provided by Sanborn (1994b). Sanborn
sought to gain a better understanding of whether juvenile court workers, including
judges, assistant district attorneys, public defenders, social workers assisting
public defenders, and probation officers, perceived juvenile waiver to be an
appropriate response to juvenile crime, what they believed were the appropriate
reasons for certification (e.g. beyond rehabilitation, protection of society,
seriousness of offense, deterrence, and conserve resources), and who they
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thought were appropriate candidates for waiver or certification. He conducted
interviews with 100 workers in three juvenile court settings (one large urban area,
one suburban area, and one rural area).
An overwhelming 88% of the workers interviewed indicated that waiver to
the adult court was needed. The respondents were asked to identify appropriate
candidates for waiver. Respondents indicated an overwhelming agreement with
the jurisdictional age of the juvenile court (89%). The majority of respondents
(91%) also agreed that the minimum age of transfer should be 14 years.
Seventy-five percent of the respondents agreed that certification should be
considered for “felonies only.” Twenty-one respondents were more restrictive,
indicating that they would like to see youths eligible for certification only for
second and first-degree felonies.
Juvenile court workers were then asked to provide information about why
this system should certify any youth. Conceptually, this issue can be approached
two ways. First, why don’t juvenile court workers want these particular youthful
offenders in the juvenile court?

Second, what do the juvenile court workers

expect from certification? The majority (77.3%) indicated that certification to the
adult court was appropriate as a response to a juvenile being beyond
rehabilitation.

When asked what waiver to the adult court represented, the

majority of respondents indicated that certification was a reflection of a lack of
resources in the juvenile justice system as well as the inability of the court to
handle certain youthful offenders. Deterrence, a need to conserve resources,
protection of society from certain offenders, and belief that certain crimes were
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too heinous to be handled in the juvenile court were also cited as reasons for
transfer. Generally, respondents indicated that certification to the adult court was
a rational and practical response for a certain range of offenses and offenders.
Finally, Sanborn (1994b) asked the workers to indicate whether they
agreed with the methods for certifying a juvenile as an adult. It is noteworthy that
among this broad sample of juvenile court workers, there was relatively little
support for prosecutors making the decision about transfers to the adult criminal
justice system. Respondents indicated that judicial transfers were better suited
to promote due process and neutrality. It is unclear whether prosecutors also will
favor vesting transfer power with judges.

Research Questions and Hypotheses
The previous examination has illuminated four key areas of juvenile justice
and juvenile certification in particular: the history of juvenile justice, the role of
the prosecutor, correlates of juvenile waiver, and attitudes toward waiver, both
those of the public and of practitioners.
Within philosophic, scholarly discussions, there is little agreement in the
literature regarding the appropriateness of transfers of youth to the adult criminal
justice system. There seems to be little cohesiveness regarding who should
make the transfer decision. Furthermore, only two studies exist that specifically
ask practitioners about their perspectives regarding certification. There is also a
clear gap in the research regarding the process by which prosecutors use their
discretion and authority in making the waiver decision and the factors that
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influence their decision to transfer or request a transfer to the adult criminal
justice system. Existing research gives us merely a pattern of the youth being
waived. Yet, official data can only illuminate so much on the subject of waiver. A
more comprehensive examination of the factors affecting juvenile waiver is
necessary. Specifically, analyzing the factors associated with the decision to
waive youth from prosecutors’ perspectives is required to begin remedying this
knowledge gap. The handling of serious youthful offenders is guided largely by
legalistic considerations. Among criminal justice practitioners, however, transfer
is widely supported for at least some youth. Yet, there is no clear understanding
about the basis for this general support. Further, there is clearly concern, both
scholarly and professionally, about the appropriateness of transfer decisions
being predominately dictated by prosecutors. As the future of the juvenile court
is debated, understanding the views of these prosecutors is essential.
The reviewed literature provides a good deal of insight into the current
state of affairs regarding juvenile exclusion.

However, much remains to be

learned in this area of juvenile justice. The majority of the research in this area
has relied on official data. As a result, policy implications, interpretation of data,
and suggestions for future directions of juvenile exclusion are restricted to what
can be gleaned from court records. To begin addressing these limitations, the
following research questions are examined here:
RQ1:

To what extent do prosecutors support the option of transfer
generally?
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RQ2:

Relatedly, to what extent would prosecutors favor abolishing the
juvenile court, maintaining it as is with some youths being excluded,
or handling all juveniles in the juvenile court?

RQ3:

To what extent do prosecutors agree or disagree with the
arguments for and against transfer?

RQ4:

To what extent do prosecutors support or oppose the various
mechanisms

of

transfer

(judicial,

legislative,

prosecutorial,

mandatory, discretionary)?

The prior literature establishes that transferring decisions vary as do
attitudes regarding the appropriateness of transfer. Based on these studies, a
series of expectations about prosecutors' views can be extended. The current
project tests the following hypotheses:
H1:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to
the youth's age.

H2:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to
the perceived maturity of a youth.

H3:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be negatively related to
the perceived likelihood of rehabilitation.

H4:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to
presence of a violent offense.

H5:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to
the severity of the offense charged.
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H6:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater when the
youth is perceived as a threat to society.

H7:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for youth with
a record of prior adjudications in the juvenile court.

H8:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be positively related to
prior commitment to a residential facility.

H9:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for youth
whose family is not supportive than for youth with supportive
families.

H10:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for minority
youth than for non-minority youth.

H11:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for male youth
than for female youth.

H12:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be greater for youth who
have not been abused than for those who have.

H13:

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion will be negatively related to
socio-economic status.

The next section provides the research methodology constructed to
examine these questions. Details on the sample, operationalization of variables,
the survey instrument, and data collection procedures are provided.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PROCEDURES
Overview
The purpose of this research is to better understand juvenile certification
to the adult criminal justice system in Florida.

While previous research has

looked at official data, empirical inquiry into the factors that influence prosecutors
to certify youth is lacking. This research will contribute to the overall body of
juvenile justice literature. More importantly it will create a foundation for a greater
understanding of the current policies and procedures available to transfer youth
to the adult criminal justice system. Specifically, this study examines attitudes of
prosecutors regarding the appropriate role of the juvenile court, the degree to
which prosecutors agree with transferring youth to the adult criminal justice
system and the various mechanisms of transfer, and the factors that are most
influential in a state attorney’s decision to certify a youth to the adult criminal
justice system.
This chapter provides a detailed description of the research methodology
and specific procedures to be employed, including the methods of sampling from
the research population, operationalization of variables, the data collection
instrument, and data collection strategy.

Research Sample
The respondents in this research were randomly selected from a sampling
frame obtained by the researcher. Several sources were considered for this
sampling frame.

The respondents in this research are in professional, legal
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positions, and it was important to obtain the most current and accurate list of
prosecutors from which to draw the sample.

The sampling frame was the

Judicial Administration Commission's most current list of State Attorneys and
Assistant State Attorneys in Florida. The Judicial Administration Commission
receives updated lists from all judicial districts in Florida on a monthly basis. On
the third week of every month, the Judicial Administration Commission receives a
current list of the State Attorneys and Assistant State Attorneys from each of
Florida's twenty judicial districts. The researcher requested the most recent list
two weeks prior to implementation of the survey.25 Because this list is regularly
updated, coverage error should be negligible. The sampling frame consisted of
1808 prosecuting attorneys.

A sample of 800 State Attorneys and Assistant

State Attorneys was randomly selected. Based on the number sampled and the
response rate of 37 percent, the sampling error is + 5%.

Data Collection Method
Mail-out surveys were utilized for data collection.

The data collection

process was based on Dillman's (2000) Tailored Design Method. The survey
involved four of Dillman's (2000, p. 150) five suggested elements for achieving
high

response

rates

in

survey

implementation:

respondent

friendly

questionnaire, multiple contacts by first-class mail, return envelopes with real
first-class stamps, and personalization of correspondence. The fifth element, a
token prepaid financial incentive, was not appropriate for the population under

25

The researcher needed this time to adequately prepare mail-out lists, labels, and database
construction prior to the initial mailing.
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study. State Attorneys in all judicial districts in Florida were mailed a pre-notice
letter three days prior to the initial mail-out. This pre-notice letter was only mailed
to State Attorneys, not Assistant State Attorneys. The purpose of this letter was
to inform the supervisors of those who would be contacted for the study, to
garner support for participation in this research, and to convey the significance of
the project.
Questionnaires, including a detailed cover letter explaining the importance
of this research, were mailed with return envelopes with first-class stamps to all
members of the sample on May 27, 2005. Five days later, a thank-you postcard
was mailed expressing sincere thanks for completing the survey. The postcard
also expressed the hope that if the respondent had yet to return the completed
survey, he or she would do so soon. Two weeks after the mailing of the initial
questionnaire, a replacement questionnaire was sent to the non-respondents.
The cover letter included in this mail-out indicated that the respondent's
completed questionnaire had yet to be received and politely urged the
respondent to complete and return the survey as soon as possible. Finally, nonrespondents were sent a final contact.

Non-respondents received a second

postcard that requested the completed survey. All written correspondence had
original signatures from this researcher. (Copies of the pre-notice letter and all
cover letters are included in Appendix A.)
The analyses presented here includes all responses that were received by
July 27, 2005. There were 58 surveys that were returned to the researcher from
the post-office as being undeliverable.
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There were also 4 ineligible surveys

returned to the researcher.

This researcher received 272 usable, completed

surveys for a response rate of 36.6%.

Operationalization of Variables
Respondent Demographics
Respondents were asked to answer a few demographic questions for
statistical analysis purposes. The following are the demographic measures used
and the answer options provided.
prosecutor, "How old are you?"

Age was measured by asking each

Ethnicity was measured by asking each

respondent to indicate whether he or she was white/caucasion, black, Hispanic,
Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American, or other. Data were also collected on
each respondent's professional experience. First, the questionnaire measured
tenure as a prosecutor: "To the best of your recollection, how many years and
months have you been a prosecutor?" Each respondent was also asked, "In
what division of the state attorney's office do you currently work?" They were
asked mark "felony," "misdemeanor," or "other." Finally, the judicial district in
which each attorney worked was determined using the addresses from the
sampling frame.

General Support for Transfer and the Role of the Juvenile Court
The appropriate role and necessity of the juvenile court has been
challenged in recent years. As reviewed in the previous chapter, there are three
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major perspectives regarding the direction and future of the juvenile court and
transfer:
1. all youths should stay in the domain of the juvenile court;
2. certain youthful offenders should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the adult
criminal justice system, and some the some youthful offenders should stay in
the juvenile system; and
3. all youths should go to the adult court, the juvenile court should be abolished,
and age should be a mitigating factor in sentencing decisions.
Prosecutors were given a series of statements concerning the appropriate
role of the juvenile court and asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed
or disagreed with each statement. The answer options were strongly agree,
agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree.

The following statements

measured the respondents' level of support for the role of the juvenile court.
•

All youthful offenders age 17 and under should be adjudicated in a separate
juvenile court, not in the adult court.

•

Most juvenile offenders should stay under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

•

In general, I support transferring some youths to the adult court.

•

In general, serious, violent juvenile offenders should be transferred to the
adult court.

•

The juvenile court's jurisdiction on a juvenile should end once he or she turns
eighteen.

•

The juvenile court should be abolished.
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Agreement with Arguments For and Against Transfer
Seventeen statements were given to prosecutors regarding the arguments
for and against transfer. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which
they agreed or disagreed with each statement using the same Likert scale
described above, where the answer options were agree strongly, agree, neutral,
disagree, and disagree strongly.

The following statements measured the

respondents' level of support for the arguments in favor of transfer:
•

Some juveniles are beyond the rehabilitation capacities of the juvenile justice
system.

•

For the protection of society, it is necessary to transfer some juveniles to the
adult court.

•

Some offenses are serious enough to warrant transfer to the adult court.

•

Resources in the juvenile justice system are too scarce to warrant spending
them on juvenile offenders who are habitually offending.

•

Transferring certain juveniles to the adult court will deter other juveniles from
committing crime.

•

Juveniles that commit serious offenses have a significant negative influence
on other youth in the juvenile justice system.

•

Juveniles that repeatedly commit crimes have a significant negative influence
on other youth in the juvenile justice system.

•

The due process rights of juvenile offenders are better protected in the adult
court.
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The following statements were utilized to ascertain prosecutors' support for
arguments against transfer.
•

Juvenile offenders get more individualized attention in the juvenile court
compared to the adult court.

•

Transferring youths to the adult court may jeopardize their futures by having a
record open to the public rather than a confidential record.

•

Juvenile offenders should not be exposed to adult offenders.

•

Juvenile offenders cannot get the proper treatment and rehabilitative services
they need in the adult system.

•

Juvenile offenders can be influenced to change easier than adult offenders.

•

Juvenile offenders do not need the same due process protections as adult
offenders because the juvenile justice system is not adversarial.

•

Juvenile offenders are less responsible for their actions than adult offenders.

•

Juvenile offenders are less mature than adult offenders.

Support For and Opposition to Methods of Certification
Eleven statements were given to prosecutors concerning support for or
opposition to various methods of certification of juvenile offenders. Respondents
were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each
statement, given the answer options agree strongly, agree, neutral, disagree, and
disagree strongly.

The following three statements measured who the

respondents believed should be responsible for certification decisions - judges or
prosecutors:
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•

Judges alone should be responsible for making transfer decisions.

•

Prosecutors alone should be responsible for making transfer decisions.

•

Prosecutors should make the transfer recommendation, but judges should
make the final transfer decision.
The juvenile court workers interviewed by Sanborn (1994b) expressed

more specific views on the various mechanisms of transfer. They pointed out
problems with waiver by legislation, prosecutors, and judges. The following eight
statements were also presented to the prosecutors in the present study to assess
their level of agreement or disagreement with these arguments.
•

A judicial waiver hearing promotes protection of youths' due process rights.

•

Mandatory transfer set out by the legislature takes away the subjective quality
of transfer.

•

Judges are inconsistent in their decisions to transfer a juvenile to the adult
court.

•

Judicial waiver is too subjective.

•

Judges are too hesitant to waive appropriate juveniles to the adult court.

•

Prosecutorial direct file is influenced by political decisions.

•

Prosecutorial direct file leads to abuse of power.

•

Statutes mandating transfer are too automatic.

Correlates of Exclusion Decisions
A factorial survey approach was used to examine the correlates of
prosecutors' waiver decisions.

The factorial survey approach involves the
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creation of a story or a vignette that contains personal and situational
characteristics that are randomly assigned to each vignette. The factorial survey
approach depicts lifelike complexities (Rossi and Anderson, 1982).

This

approach enables researchers to distinguish the individual influence of
characteristics on attitudes (Rossi and Anderson, 1982).
This method was appropriate for two reasons. First, prior research has
looked only at official data to determine the factors that are most influential in
certification decisions. Use of official records limits the types of variables that
can be examined and the manner in which they are operationalized. In contrast,
a factorial vignette survey uses hypothetical scenarios to examine the
determinants of decision-making. Thus, a researcher is free to construct the best
operationalization of all salient variables, rather than being constrained to
whatever is available in official records.
Second, some criminal justice processing characteristics are highly
correlated in reality (Rossi and Anderson, 1982). Using data from official records
of actual cases, therefore, limits our ability to assess the independent effects of
these variables.

In contrast, factorial vignettes are constructed by randomly

selecting one level from each dimension. The result is that each dimension is
orthogonal (within the limits of probability sampling) and their effects on decision
making can be separated. Thus, factorial vignette analysis can disentangle the
effects on transfer of race and economic status, gender and offense, and other
salient variables.
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Youthful Offender Dimensions and Levels
Each survey contained one factorial vignette, formatted as a charging
sheet. The following are the variables or dimensions included in the factorial
vignette.

The possible values for each dimension, called levels, are also

presented. Using the Vigwrite Software Program, one level for each dimension
was randomly assigned in each vignette.
Age
Ages were provided in increments of individual years ranging from 12 to
17 years old. The lower range of this dimension was determined based on the
data from Florida (2001-2002). No youths under twelve were transferred to the
adult court. Thus, while it is possible that a youth younger than twelve might be
transferred to the adult court, it is a rare occurrence in Florida; most youths
waived to the adult court are much older (see Table 1.4). The upper limit of
seventeen years old was established because he or she has reached the age of
majority in Florida and would be under the jurisdiction of the adult court.
Gender
The gender of the youth was given as male or female.
Ethnicity
Ethnicity was presented as three possibilities: white, black, or Hispanic.
Ethnicity, as opposed to race, was used for a couple of reasons. First, prior
research looking at correlates of transfer has predominantly looked at race as a
correlate to transfer. The attributes are often presented in terms of either white or
non-white. Hispanics could potentially be coded as white or non-white using
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available data in which the researcher had no control over the operationalization
of the variables. Second, as presented in Chapter 1, ethnicity may be more
relevant as a variable depending on the geographic location of the research.
Florida does have a large Hispanic population. Thus, whites and Hispanics were
distinguished.
Family Environment
Prior research by Applegate et al. (2000) suggests that perceptions about
a youth's family can substantially influence juvenile court decisions (also see
Sanborn, 1995).

Three separate dimensions operationalized aspects of the

youth's home environment.
Prior History of Abuse:
No prior history of abuse by family member(s)
Prior history of abuse by family member(s)
Family Socio-Economic Status
Upper-income family
Middle-income family
Lower-income family
Level of Family Support
Family appears willing and able to participate in any special
requirements that might be imposed by the court.
Family appears neither willing nor able to participate in any special
requirements that might be imposed by the court.
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Prior Adjudications and Commitments
Youth has no prior adjudications in the juvenile court and no prior
commitments
Youth has one prior felony adjudication in the juvenile court and no prior
commitments
Youth has three prior felony adjudications in the juvenile court and no prior
commitments
Youth has one prior felony adjudication in the juvenile court and one prior
commitment to a juvenile residential facility
Youth has three prior felony adjudications in the juvenile court and one
prior commitment to a juvenile residential facility26
Maturity
Youth's maturity is appropriate to age
Youth is less mature than same-age peers
Youth is more mature than same-age peers
Current Offense
The vignette also included current offense as a dimension for assignment.
Three broad offense types were included for consideration: person, property,
and drug. These offenses were included because prior research, using official
data, has identified differences in transfer rates for these types of offenses.
Other offenses, as noted in Table 1.2, only represent a small portion of total
cases transferred to the adult court. Further, the type of offenses included as

26

The selection of these levels was weighted so that approximately one-third of the vignettes
described a youth with no priors, one prior, or three prior adjudications in the juvenile court.
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other are quite varied and relatively minor, such as a violation of probation.
Thus, other offense types were not included.
Variations within offense type were also included to manipulate the
offense and the severity of the offense. The items were constructed to vary the
extent of harm. Warr's (1989) research has shown that offenses that cause
greater harm are perceived as more serious. All of the levels, however, include
offenses for which youth may be certified to the adult court under Florida law.
Finally, the offense possibilities were those for which youth are relatively
commonly referred to the juvenile court (e.g. burglary, not identity theft).
Person Offenses
Robbery
•

The youth is accused of threatening to beat up a young girl unless she
gave up her money. The victim gave up $20 dollars and was not
physically harmed.

•

The youth is accused of threatening to stab a young girl with a large
knife unless she gave up her money. The victim gave up $20, and was
not physically harmed.

Aggravated Battery
•

The youth is accused of intentionally cutting another youth with a
knife during an argument. The victim had a small cut on the arm,
requiring three stitches.
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•

The youth is accused of intentionally cutting another youth with a
knife during an argument. The victim was cut badly on both arms,
requiring more than 20 stitches.

Property offenses
Burglary
•

The youth is accused of breaking into a residence and stealing about
$100 worth of merchandise.

•

The youth is accused of breaking into a residence and stealing about
$1,000 worth of merchandise.

Auto Theft
•

The youth is accused of stealing an automobile. The car was located
and returned undamaged to the owner.

•

The youth is accused of stealing an automobile. The car was located
and was damaged beyond repair.

Drug offenses
Felony Marijuana
•

The youth is accused of possessing one plastic baggy containing
approximately one ounce of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

•

The youth is accused of possessing twelve plastic baggies filled with
marijuana. The youth also had $400 cash in a jacket pocket.

Felony Non-Marijuana
•

The youth is accused of possessing 1 rock of crack cocaine for
personal use.
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•

The youth is accused of possessing 15 individually wrapped rocks of
crack cocaine. The youth also had $400 cash in a jacket pocket.

Amenability to Treatment
After reading the vignettes the prosecutors were given statements to
determine their perceptions about the youth's amenability to treatment.

This

question was constructed to determine the degree to which prosecutors think the
described youth is able to change. The answer options were agree strongly,
agree, neutral, disagree, and disagree strongly.

The following statements

measured the respondents' perceptions about the youth's ability to change.
•

Given the proper care and individualized treatment, this youth can
change for the better.

Threat to Society
Prosecutors were then given a measure to determine whether or not they
perceived the youth to be a threat to society.

Respondents were given a

statement then asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed
using the same five-point Likert scale as above. The following statement was
used to measure perceived threat to society:
•

This youth poses a significant threat to society.

Prosecutorial Preference for Exclusion
The purpose of this study is to examine the factors that influence
prosecutorial decision-making. In order to achieve this goal, prosecutors were
asked to render a judgment on what they would want to see actually happen with
the youth in the vignette. Prosecutors were given the following item:
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•

Regardless of what the law currently allows, we would like to know your own
views on the best way to handle this juvenile's case.

Based on the

information provided, what are the chances that you would want to certify this
youth to the adult court? ______% (0% means the youth would stay in the
juvenile court, and 100% means the youth would go to the adult court. You
can also choose any number in between).

Data Collection Instrument
The survey questionnaire, which is provided in Appendix B, was pretested in two ways recommended by Dillman (2000).

First, the research

instrument was given to knowledgeable colleagues. This was done to ensure
that all of the necessary questions were included and to eliminate duplicate,
unclear, or unnecessary measures.

Second, using cognitive interviews, the

instrument was tested with 2 Assistant State Attorneys from the Ninth Judicial
District. Structured, cognitive interviews were conducted to determine whether
respondents would understand each question and whether they could answer
each question accurately (Dillman, 2000). The pre-test procedure followed the
"think-aloud" method explained by Dillman (2000, p. 142). Based on the pretesting, some changes were made to simplify statements in order to improve
comprehension and enhance reliability of items.
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The Respondents
Two hundered and seventy-two prosecutors completed the survey
instrument.

The majority of the respondents were males (61%).

The

respondents' ages ranged from 24 to 65, with a mean of 40 years. The vast
majority of the respondents were white (87.6%), followed by Hispanic (6%), then
black prosecutors (4.1%).

Most of the prosecutors that participated in the

research worked in their Felony division (58%) and had at some point been
involved in the decision-making process to transfer a juvenile to the adult court
(64%). The prosecutors in this study were fairly experienced (M = 9 years, 5
months), ranging from 10 months to 32 years of experience.
chapter provides the results of their participation in this research.
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The following

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

Chapter 3 reported the methods that were employed to collect the data
for this research.

This chapter presents the results of this research effort.

Generally, this discussion is divided into two sections: a descriptive analysis of
prosecutors' attitudes toward transfer and an assessment of the predictors of
transfer decisions.

Support of Juvenile Transfer and the Role of the Juvenile Court
In order to address the first two research questions, prosecutors were
given statements to assess their views on the concept of juvenile transfer in
general. Further, they were given a series of statements constructed to measure
the extent to which they would favor handling all juveniles in the juvenile court,
abolishing the juvenile court, and maintaining the juvenile court as it is, with some
youths being excluded. As shown in Table 4.1, almost all prosecutors agreed
with the statement that, in general, some youths should be transferred to the
adult court.

Further, more than three-fourths of prosecutors agreed with the

statement that most juvenile offenders should remain under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. Taken together, these results indicate considerable support for
transfer as an option for handling juvenile cases but a belief that it should not be
applied in a blanket manner. This interpretation is reinforced by prosecutors'
responses to two other items.
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Table 4.1: Overall Support for Juvenile Transfer and the Role of the Juvenile Court
Item

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Mean

In general, I support transferring some youths to
the adult court (n=272)

4.4%

1.1%

0.7%

33.1%

60.7%

4.44

Most juvenile offenders should stay under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court (n=272)

5.9%

8.5%

8.5%

59.6%

17.6%

3.75

54%

31.6%

4.4%

6.3%

3.7%

1.74

The juvenile court should be abolished (n=271)

58.7%

32.8%

3.7%

1.8%

3.0%

1.58

The juvenile court's jurisdiction on a juvenile
should end once he or she turns eighteen
(n=272)

20.6%

33.8%

11.8%

21.7%

12.1%

2.71

In general, serious, violent juvenile offenders
should be transferred to the adult court (n=272)

2.2%

5.9%

4.8%

33.7%

53.5%

4.30

All juvenile offenders age 17 and under should
be adjudicated in a separate juvenile court, not in
the adult court (n=272)

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Eighty-five percent of Florida's prosecutors disagreed with handling all
juveniles in a separate juvenile court.

At the same time, nearly ninety-two

percent of prosecutors disagreed with the statement that the juvenile court
should be abolished. Prosecutors appear to agree with a more moderate view of
juvenile transfer. That is, most juvenile offenders should be adjudicated in the
juvenile court and some juveniles should be transferred to the adult court.
Beginning insight into which juveniles prosecutors believe ought to be removed
from juvenile court jurisdiction is provided by the final item reported in Table 4.1.
When prosecutors were asked whether serious, violent juvenile offenders should
be transferred to the adult court, almost nine in ten agreed. It is important to note
that prosecutors do not support the elimination of the juvenile court.

Support for Arguments For and Against Transfer
As reviewed in Chapter 2, several arguments for and against the idea of
juvenile transfer have developed in the literature.

Prosecutors were given

statements to measure the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with these
positions. Table 4.2 illustrates prosecutors' extent of agreement with arguments
offered in favor of transferring juveniles to the adult court.
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Table 4.2: Prosecutors' Support for Arguments for Transfer of Juveniles to the Adult Court
Item

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Mean

0.4%

0.4%

1.1%

22%

76.2%

4.73

For the protection of society, it is necessary to
transfer some juveniles to the adult court (n=272)

0.4%

1.1%

0.7%

24.9%

72.9%

4.69

Some juveniles are beyond the rehabilitation
capacities of the juvenile justice system (n=272)

1.5%

0.7%

2.9%

35.3%

59.6%

4.51

Juveniles that repeatedly commit crimes have a
significant negative influence on other youth in the
juvenile justice system (n=272)

0.4%

4.4%

25.7%

51.5%

18%

3.82

Juveniles that commit serious offenses have a
significant negative influence on other youth in the
juvenile justice system (n=272)

0.4%

5.1%

32%

46.7%

15.8%

3.72

Transferring certain juveniles to the adult court will
deter other juveniles from committing crime (n=272)

4.8%

20.6%

28.7%

36.4%

9.6%

3.25

Resources in the juvenile justice system are too scarce
to warrant spending them on juvenile offenders who are
habitually offending (n=270)

5.6%

24.8%

27.4%

28.1%

14.1%

3.20

The due process rights of juvenile offenders are better
protected in the adult court (n=272)

9.2%

34.9%

44.9%

8.5%

2.6%

2.60

Some offenses are serious enough to warrant transfer
to the adult court (n=272)
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Nearly all of the arguments for transfer of juvenile offenders to the adult
court received strong support from Florida prosecutors. As shown in Table 4.2,
virtually all of the prosecutors surveyed believe that transfer of some juveniles is
justified by the seriousness of some offenses and by the need to protect society.
Over ninety percent agree that some juveniles are beyond the rehabilitation
capacities of the juvenile justice system. Strong consideration for transfer was
also given to the influence serious or repeat juvenile offenders may have on
other youth in the juvenile justice system. Nearly half of the prosecutors agreed
that transferring certain juveniles to the adult court would deter other juveniles
from committing crime.

However, two arguments for the support of juvenile

transfer to the adult court did not receive much support. One argument is the
idea that resources in the juvenile system are too scarce to warrant spending
them on habitual offenders. This argument received only mild support (42.2%
agreed or strongly agreed with this statement). Prosecutors also showed little
enthusiasm for supposed differences in due process protections. Only 11.1% of
prosecutors agreed that the adult court provides better protection of due process
rights than the juvenile court, and more than 44% disagreed with this contention.
The data in Table 4.3 illustrate prosecutors' views on the arguments that
have been offered against transfer of juvenile offenders to the adult court.

In

general, arguments against juvenile transfer did not receive the strong support
seen in the arguments for juvenile transfer.
transfer received a strong degree of support:

Only three arguments against
juvenile offenders get more

individualized attention in the juvenile court, juvenile offenders are less mature
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than their adult counterparts, and juvenile offenders can be influenced to change
easier than adult offenders. A majority of prosecutors disagreed that juveniles
are less culpable than adults are and that transferring them to the adult system
would compromise juveniles' chances at rehabilitation. The degree of support for
arguments against transfer appears consistent with prosecutors' views on
transfer in general.
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Table 4.3: Prosecutors' Support for Arguments Against Transfer
Item

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Mean

Juvenile offenders are less mature than adult
offenders (n=270)

2.2%

6.7%

14.1%

65.6%

11.5%

3.77

Juvenile offenders get more individualized attention in
the juvenile court compared to the adult court (n=271)

1.8%

19.9%

26.9%

42.1%

9.2%

3.37

Juvenile offenders can be influenced to change easier
than adult offenders (n=271)

2.2%

23.2%

30.6%

38.0%

5.9%

3.22

Transferring youths to the adult court may
jeopardize their futures by having a record open
to the public rather than a confidential record (n=270)

4.8%

25.6%

28.1%

39.3%

2.2%

3.09

Juvenile offenders should not be exposed to
adult offenders (n=271)

6.6%

31.7%

26.6%

28.8%

6.3%

2.96

Juvenile offenders cannot get the proper treatment
and rehabilitative services they need in the adult
system ( (n=272)

10.3%

57.4%

19.9%

11.0%

1.5%

2.36

Juvenile offenders are less responsible for their
actions than adult offenders (n=270)

18.9%

47.4%

17.4%

13.3%

3.0%

2.34

Juvenile offenders do not need the same due
process protections as adult offenders because
the juvenile justice system is not adversarial (n=270)

21.9%

53.3%

15.9%

7.4%

1.5%

2.13
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Prosecutors' Views on Mechanisms of Juvenile Transfer
Prosecutors were given a series of statements intended to measure their
support for the various mechanisms of juvenile transfer. Specifically, prosecutors
were asked about who (judges, prosecutors, or legislature) should make the
transfer decisions.

Further, prosecutors were asked to respond to several

statements about potential benefits and problems with various mechanisms of
transfer. Table 4.4 illustrates the responses.
As shown by the results on the first set of items in the table, prosecutors
did not support judges being responsible for the transfer decision. Nearly ninetytwo percent of respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement
that "judges alone should be responsible for making transfer decisions."
Moreover, almost two-thirds opposed a process where prosecutors would
recommend transfer but judges would make the final decision. Some insight into
the basis for this lack of enthusiasm regarding judicial transfer is provided by the
responses to the next three items listed in Table 4.4. As shown in the table,
prosecutors indicated strong support for the idea that judges are too inconsistent
in their transfer decisions and that judicial waiver is too subjective. One final
explanation for this lack of support was that judges are too hesitant to waive
youth who are appropriate for the adult court. This perspective only received
mild support from prosecutors.
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Table 4.4: Prosecutors' Views on Mechanisms of Juvenile Transfer
Item

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Mean

Judges alone should be responsible for making
transfer decisions (n=271)

57.2%

33.2%

7.0%

1.1%

1.5%

1.56

Prosecutors should make the transfer
recommendation, but judges should make the final
transfer decision (n=269)

32.3%

33.1%

14.1%

19.3%

1.1%

2.24

Judges are inconsistent in their decisions to transfer
a juvenile to the adult court (n=269)

0.7%

10.0%

50.6%

27.5%

11.2%

3.38

Judges are too hesitant to waive appropriate
Juveniles to the adult court (n=270)

1.9%

14.1%

54.4%

21.9%

7.8%

3.20

Judicial waiver is too subjective (n=268)

1.9%

15.3%

53.4%

22.0%

7.5%

3.18

A judicial waiver hearing promotes protection of youths'
due process rights (n=268)

4.9%

14.9%

55.6%

23.9%

0.7%

3.01

Prosecutors alone should be responsible for making
transfer decisions (n=271)

6.3%

20.7%

12.9%

32.5%

27.7%

3.55

Prosecutorial direct file is influenced by political
Decisions (n=271)

21.4%

42.4%

19.2%

15.9%

1.1%

2.33

Prosecutorial direct file leads to abuse of power
(n=271)

43.2%

48.3%

7.0%

0.7%

0.7%

1.68

Mandatory transfer set out by the legislature takes
away the subjective quality of transfer (n=270)

3.7%

15.6%

24.8%

45.2%

10.7%

3.44

Statutes mandating transfer are too automatic (n=270)

8.1%

25.2%

36.3%

27.0%

3.3%

2.92
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Not too surprisingly, prosecutors indicated moderate to strong support for
prosecutors being the sole decision-makers in transfer decisions (60.2% agreed
or strongly agreed).

Further, when asked about potential problems with

prosecutors making transfer decisions, few respondents believed these were
valid concerns.

Specifically, almost two-thirds of prosecutors disagreed that

prosecutorial direct-file is influenced by political decisions and nearly all of the
respondents thought that prosecutorial direct-file does not lead to abuse of
power. By and large, prosecutors do not believe that their involvement in transfer
decisions is problematic in the ways that others have suggested.
Finally, prosecutors were asked about their perceptions of mandatory
transfer as set out in legislation. A slight majority of prosecutors agreed with the
argument that mandatory transfer takes away the subjective quality of transfer
decisions (55.9%) and did not seem to perceive mandatory transfer as being too
automatic. This somewhat divided response may be indicative of the fact that,
while legislation may "mandate" transfer to the adult court, prosecutors ultimately
have the authority and discretion to file in adult or juvenile court by deciding on
the final charges.

Correlates of Support for Juvenile Transfer
In order assess whether the findings support the thirteen hypotheses
posed in Chapter 2, bivariate and multivariate analyses were performed. The
predictors of transfer decisions focused on the responses of the prosecutors to
the juveniles described in the vignettes. As described in the previous chapter,
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the factorial vignettes allowed for assessment of the impact of multiple case
characteristics on prosecutors' support for transfer. Initially, three bivariate tests
were employed to determine associations between the dependent variable,
"Chance you would want to transfer this youth," and the independent variables
introduced in the hypotheses. This section presents the results of these tests.
Pearson product-moment correlations were utilized to assess the
relationship between the dependent variable and three independent variables:
vignette offender age, perceived chance of rehabilitation, and perceived threat to
society. The correlation coefficients for the measures are presented in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 - Pearson Correlations between Likelihood of Transfer
Recommendation and Independent Variables
Correlation
n

M (SD)

1

2

1 - Likelihood of Transfer
Recommendation

269

22.11 (29.76)

2 - Vignette Offender Age

272

14.51 (1.71)

.266**

1.00

3 - Chance of Rehabilitation

269

3.86 (.76)

-.321**

-.022

4 - Threat to Society

270

3.10 (2.70)

.142*

.051

3

4

1.00

1.00
-.344**

1.00

* p < .05, ** p < .001

Prosecutorial preference for exclusion was significantly related to vignette
offender age, perceived chance of rehabilitation, and perceived threat to society.
Specifically, prosecutorial preference is positively related to both the offender's
age and the degree to which prosecutors think the juvenile poses a future threat
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to society. Further, preference for exclusion is negatively related to the degree to
which prosecutors believe the juvenile can be rehabilitated.
T-tests were used to test the effects of gender, history of abuse, and
family support on prosecutorial preference for exclusion. As shown in Table 4.6,
there was no significant difference in prosecutorial preference for transferring
males versus females.

Further, there was no significant difference in

prosecutorial preference for exclusion for those youth who had an established
history of family abuse and those who did not.

No significant differences in

preference for exclusion were detected for those juveniles whose families were
willing and able to participate in any special requirements imposed by the court.

Table 4.6 - T-test for Dichotomous Variables by Likelihood of Transfer
Recommendation
Independent Variable

Mean Likelihood of Transfer
Recommendation

t value

p

21.96

-.074

.941

-1.446

.149

.055

.957

-2.362

.019

Vignette Offender Gender
Female
Male

22.23

Prior History of Abuse
No Prior History of Abuse

19.36

Prior History of Abuse

24.60

Family Support and Participation
No

22.21

Yes

22.01

History of Prior Juvenile Commitments
No
18.73
Yes
27.46
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A t test was also used to test the effect of prior commitment record on
prosecutorial preference for exclusion (see Table 4.6), revealing a significant
difference in preference for exclusion between the two histories. On average,
preference for exclusion was about nine percentage points higher for juveniles
who had a prior juvenile commitment.
Prosecutorial preference for exclusion was analyzed on five additional
variables using One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).

The results of the

analysis are provided in Table 4.7.
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences in prosecutorial
preference for exclusion across the three levels of socio-economic status for the
juvenile described in the vignette (lower-income family, middle-income family, or
upper-income family). Further, no significant differences were found to exist in
preference for exclusion across the three levels of youth's maturity (youth is less
mature than same-age peers, youth's maturity is appropriate to age, or youth is
more mature than same-age peers).
ANOVA revealed a significant difference in prosecutorial preference for
exclusion across the six levels of offense type. To further assess the differences
among the six levels of offense type (battery, assault, breaking and entering,
auto theft, marijuana possession, and crack cocaine possession) on the main
effect for prosecutorial preference, the Scheffe post hoc procedure was
performed. The results indicate that prosecutorial preference for exclusion for
battery offenses differs significantly from breaking and entering (p = .008), auto
theft (p = .000), marijuana possession (p = .015), and crack cocaine possession
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(p = .000). Prosecutorial preference for exclusion for battery did not significantly
differ from assault offenses (p = .087), and there were no other significant
differences among the theft, drug, or assault offenses.

Table 4.7 - One-Way Analysis of Variance for Prosecutorial Likelihood of
Transfer Recommendation by Independent Variables
Likelihood of Transfer
Recommendation
Standard
Deviation

F

Sig

37.88
31.67
28.08
20.78
26.51
18.23

7.613

.000

9.39
20.79
30.79

21.00
30.27
30.94

10.880

.000

Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic

18.72
17.17
30.92

28.63
25.83
32.86

5.697

.004

Maturity
More mature than same-age peers
Maturity appropriate to age
Less mature than same-age peers

19.52
27.84
19.40

27.52
33.99
27.21

2.323

.100

28.05
29.86
30.96

1.273

.282

Correlate

Mean

Offense Type
Battery
Assault
Breaking and entering
Auto theft
Marijuana possession
Crack cocaine possession

44.18
25.78
20.37
12.23
20.52
9.87

Prior Offenses
No prior adjudication
One prior adjudication
Three prior adjudications

SES
Upper-income family
Middle-income family
Lower-income family

18.06
23.00
24.79

ANOVA revealed a significant difference in prosecutorial preference for
exclusion by history of prior offenses (no priors, one prior, three priors). Post-hoc
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analysis indicates significant differences in prosecutorial preference for exclusion
for youth with three priors from youths with no priors (, p = .000) and one prior (p
= .044). The chances a prosecutor would want to exclude a youth from the
juvenile court were not significantly different when youths with one offense were
compared to those with no prior offenses.
Prosecutorial preference for exclusion by ethnicity was also analyzed
using one-way ANOVA. Results indicate a significant difference in preference for
exclusion by ethnicity. To further assess the differences across race, post hoc
procedures were employed.

Scheffe analysis indicates that prosecutorial

preference for exclusion differs significantly for Hispanic youth from white youth
(p = .019 ) and black youth (p = .011), but preference for transferring whites
versus blacks was not significantly different.

Determinants of Juvenile Transfer
A multiple regression analysis was performed between likelihood of
transfer and the independent variables that the bivariate analyses had revealed
to be significantly related to preference for exclusion:

offense type, age of

juvenile, presence of prior offenses, severity of offense, prior commitments,
ethnicity of juvenile, threat to society score, likelihood of rehabilitation score,
ethnicity of respondent, age of respondent, number of years as a prosecutor,
respondent's gender, and whether the respondent has ever been involved in
making a transfer decision. Assumptions of regression were tested using normal
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probability plots of residuals as well as scatter diagrams of residuals by predicted
residuals. No violations of regression assumptions were detected.
Regression analysis revealed that the model significantly predicated
likelihood of juvenile transfer, F (13, 242) = 10.924, p < .001. R2 for the model
was .370, and adjusted was R2 .336. Table 4.8 provides the unstandardized
regression coefficients (B) and standardized coefficients (β).
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Table 4.8 - Regression Model for Prosecutorial Preference for Juvenile
Transfer
Predictor Variable

Coding

B Coefficient

β

t

Sig.

Age of Juvenile

4.377

.255

4.913

.000

Threat to Society
Score

6.313

.244

3.886

.000

Presence of
Violent Offense

1 = Violent
0 = Non
Violent

10.927

.173

3.048

.003

Ethnicity of
Juvenile

1 = Hispanic
0 = Non
Hispanic

9.798

.151

2.867

.005

Presence of Prior
Adjudications

3.620

.146

2.496

.013

Likelihood of
Rehabilitation
Score

-4.922

-.128

-2.221

.027

6.170

.102

1.873

.062

.307

.005

.090

.928

Years as a
Prosecutor

.415

.122

1.433

.153

Respondent's Age

-.301

-.112

-1.401

.163

-4.801

-.052

-.969

.334

-.254

-.004

-.076

.939

-.182

-.003

-.052

.959

Severity of
Offense

1 = More
Severe
0 = Less
Severe

Prior
Commitments

1 = Priors
0 = No Priors

Respondent's
Ethnicity
Respondent's
Gender
Ever Been
Involvement in
Transfer Decision

1 = White
0 = NonWhite
1 = Male
0 = Female
1= Yes
0 = No
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Six variables contributed significantly to prosecutorial preference for
exclusion. Most important in the model was in the individual effect of the age of
the juvenile. Prosecutorial preference for exclusion rose a predicted 4.4
percentage points for each year of increase in the juvenile’s age. Perceived
threat to society was the second most important predictor of prosecutorial
preference for transfer; the greater the perceived threat to society, the more likely
a prosecutor would prefer transfer to the adult court. For every point higher a
juvenile was scored on the five-point threat scale, prosecutorial preference for
exclusion rose by 6.3 percentage points. The presence of a violent offense was
also a significant predictor of prosecutorial preference. Prosecutorial preference
for transfer to the adult court was nearly 11 percentage points higher for youth
who were accused of violent offenses (i.e., assault or battery) than for those
facing other charges.
The juvenile’s ethnicity also contributed significantly to explaining
variations in the preference to exclude a juvenile to the adult court. Preference
for transfer to the adult court was 9.8 percentage points higher among
prosecutors when they considered a Hispanic rather than a Non-Hispanic youth.
Further, the standardized regression coefficient suggests that the ethnicity of the
juvenile explained approximately fifteen percent of the variance in prosecutorial
preference for juvenile transfer. The presence of a prior offense was also a
significant predictor of prosecutorial preference for exclusion. Those juveniles
who had prior adjudications were somewhat, though not dramatically, more likely
to be recommended for transfer to the adult court.
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Finally, the perceived

likelihood of rehabilitation contributed to the preference for transfer to the adult
court.

This negative relationship indicates that prosecutors are less likely to

recommend transfer to the adult court for juveniles who they believe are more
amenable to treatment. The severity of the vignette offense was not significant in
the model at explaining prosecutorial preference for transfer to the adult court.
Prosecutors' demographics were also included in the regression model.
As seen in Table 4.8, none of the prosecutors' characteristics were significant in
the model. Thus, there is no evidence of particular kinds of prosecutors being
more or less in favor of transfer to the adult court.
The overall model explains over one-third of the variation in prosecutorial
preference for exclusion.

While this model explains a moderate amount of

variation in the decision to transfer juveniles to the adult court, the fact that a
majority of the variation remains unexplained suggests a question for further
exploration: What other information would prosecutors use to ultimately make
this transfer decision?

Other Factors in Transfer Decisions
Prosecutors were asked to report any additional information, above and
beyond that reported in the vignette, would have helped them to make the
transfer decision. Most of the respondents (n = 211) provided further insight into
factors that influence the decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult court. The
two most important factors identified by prosecutors were the nature of the
current offense and the nature of any prior offenses.
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Nature of Current Offense
Repeatedly, prosecutors indicated that further detail on the nature of the
current offense would be helpful in making a transfer determination.

For

example, if the vignette included a violent crime (battery or assault), prosecutors
wanted to know more detail on the events leading up to the offense, the location
of the offense (e.g., did offense occur on school property or in the community),
and the relationship between the victim and the offender. In vignettes including
property offenses, prosecutors wanted greater details on the type of property that
was stolen (e.g., guns or clothing). For auto theft property offenses, prosecutors
wanted greater detail as to how the auto was stolen.

For example, did the

offender steal car keys or was the automobile "hot-wired."

Prosecutors also

indicated that they wanted additional information on the degree of property
damage. For drug offenses, many prosecutors indicated concern with how and
where the drugs were seized. Across all types of offenses, prosecutors wanted
details on the level of sophistication surrounding the crime, whether the offender
acted alone or in collusion with other juveniles, and whether there was any
indication of premeditation.
Further, prosecutors indicated that input from other criminal justice
professionals would be helpful in making the transfer decision regarding the
nature of the present offense.

Respondents indicated that law enforcement

could be a useful source of information when considering transfer. Specifically,
prosecutors indicated a need to know whether the juvenile was cooperative with
law enforcement and if the juvenile had admitted guilt to law enforcement. The
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Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was also mentioned as a criminal justice
resource that would be useful in making in the transfer decision. Prosecutors
indicated that input from DJJ would be helpful as well as any counselor input.
Nature of Prior Offenses
The nature of the juvenile's prior involvement in criminal activity was
another consideration provided by prosecutors.

Prosecutors wanted further

detail on the nature of the prior offenses (e.g., violent, drug, or property), the age
that the criminal activity was known to begin, whether the juvenile had a history
of weapons or violent offenses, and the number of prior arrests (regardless of
whether they resulted in a juvenile adjudication). Prosecutors also indicated that
the time intervals between criminal justice contacts might be helpful in making
the transfer decision. Further, respondents indicated a need to identify whether
there was a history of escalating behaviors. For example, if the juvenile began
with relatively minor offenses and graduated to more serious offenses, this would
weigh heavily on the prosecutor's decision to transfer. This was of particular
concern if there was a pattern of violent offenses and if the violent behavior was
escalating.
Prosecutors also indicated that prior performance and compliance in the
criminal justice system would be helpful in making transfer decisions.
Prosecutors wanted to know if the juvenile contested any prior convictions and
the level of compliance with any prior sanctions.

Specifically, respondents

wanted to know how the juvenile performed while under DJJ supervision.
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Prior Commitments
In vignettes where the juvenile had a prior commitment to a juvenile
facility, prosecutors wanted additional information on the type of facility to which
the juvenile was committed.

Prosecutors indicated that the level of the

commitment facility could influence their transfer decisions. Further, respondents
wanted additional details on the length of time from commitments to the current
offense. Prosecutors wanted to know if the juvenile was currently on some form
of juvenile supervision. Finally, prosecutors wanted additional information on the
types of services that were previously offered to the juvenile offender.
Victim Consideration
Prosecutors listed several victim considerations as being influential in
making the transfer decision. The age of the victim as well as victim, or victim's
family, input would be important components in the decision to transfer.
Respondents also wanted additional information on the relationship between the
victim and offender (e.g., strangers or classmates).
Educational Factors
Prosecutors

identified

educational

factors

as

being

important

considerations for transfer decisions. Specifically, respondents wanted to know
whether the juvenile attended school. If the juvenile did regularly attend school,
prosecutors wanted to know more information on the juvenile's grades as well as
his or her behavior at school.

Respondents also indicated a need to know

whether the juvenile was involved with any extra-curricular activities such as
organized sports. Finally, prosecutors indicated that input from the educational
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professionals with regular contact with the juvenile might be helpful.

For

example, respondents indicated they wanted to know if the juvenile had any
teacher or educational support.
Family Issues
Prosecutors cited the family environment as being relevant in making
transfer decisions. Respondents wanted additional information on the parents
and any siblings in the home. For example, prosecutors wanted to know whether
the parents or siblings in the home had any criminal history, particularly for
violent offenses, and whether the family had any history of contacts with the
Department of Children and Families. Respondents wanted to ensure that the
family could provide adequate supervision of the juvenile. For example, several
prosecutors wanted to know if the juvenile could benefit from a treatment facility
rather than continue to reside in the family environment.
If the vignette provided a history of physical abuse in the home,
prosecutors wanted additional information on the type, extent, and duration of the
abuse.

The overall consideration regarding family factors was whether the

parent(s) could provide a safe and stable home environment for the juvenile.
Prosecutors indicated a desire for additional information on the immediate
neighborhood as well.
Other Juvenile Issues
Prosecutors also listed other important considerations when making the
decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult court. They wanted to know if the
juvenile was known to be in a gang or to affiliate with known gang members.
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They wanted to know if the juvenile had a history of drug or alcohol use or abuse.
The attitude of the juvenile toward society and the community was well as their
attitude in court may also influence a prosecutor's decision to transfer.

For

example, if the juvenile seems remorseful and willing to change or is willing to
cooperate in other prosecutions (e.g., identifying drug sources), some
prosecutors indicated they would be less inclined to push for juvenile transfer.
Prosecutors also identified psychological issues as important in their
transfer decisions.

Specifically, respondents want access to mental health

histories, I.Q. tests, and psychological evaluations.
Juvenile Transfer
Finally, prosecutors provided some additional issues that may contribute
to the decision to transfer juveniles to the adult court. Prosecutors indicated that
the preference of the juvenile would determine whether a juvenile is transferred
as an adult. For example, several prosecutors indicated that they would give the
charged juvenile a choice: plead guilty and remain in the juvenile court or plead
not guilty and have an adult trial. Another consideration was whether the juvenile
court and the juvenile justice system had exhausted all possible remedies.
Prosecutors also indicated that the availability of an appropriate residential
treatment facility might work to keep juveniles in the juvenile court.

The

respondents suggested that these commitment facilities might be able to provide
the individualized services and programs necessary to protect society and
ensure that juveniles do not return to the criminal justice system.
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Finally, prosecutors identified plausible court sentences or sanctions being
a determinant of juvenile transfer. The present study did not ask prosecutors
about preferred sanctions or sentences that the juvenile in the vignettes should
receive; yet, this concern is clearly a deciding factor when making the transfer
decision. Several prosecutors identified the juvenile in their vignettes as being a
threat to society. However, these same prosecutors indicated a reluctance to
transfer the juvenile to the adult court.

Ultimately, concern for public safety

appeared to be the deciding factor. These prosecutors all reported that in the
juvenile court system, the youth would be placed in an appropriate commitment
facility.

Respondents indicated that these same juveniles in the adult court,

receiving adult sanctions, would merely receive probation with little or no
supervision in the community and, therefore, would pose a greater threat to
society.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

Introduction
Prosecutors are important and powerful in the criminal justice system,
particularly because of their discretion (Davis, 1969, Walker, 1993). Not only do
they have the power to act on behalf of the state, but they also have "negative
power" (Davis, 1969, p. 188). Negative power refers to their ability to withhold
prosecution (Davis, 1969).

This negative and positive discretionary power is

particularly important and relevant in the area of juvenile transfer to the adult
court.

Ultimately, prosecutors will determine the final charges, and in many

instances, the court of jurisdiction for juvenile offenders. While there are several
mechanisms in Florida by which a juvenile can be transferred to the adult court,
each procedure is influenced by prosecutorial decision-making (Klein, 1998;
Schiraldi, 1999).
The aim of this research was to address the limitations in the current
research regarding juvenile transfer to the adult court. A survey instrument was
sent to a random sample of 800 State Attorneys and Assistant State attorneys in
Florida. This chapter discusses the findings from the current research, the policy
implications of the research, and suggests important and necessary areas of
future juvenile justice research.

Further, limitations of the current study are

presented.
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Overview of Research Questions
To begin addressing the limitations in juvenile transfer research, four
research questions were examined.

Prosecutors were given a series of

statements to assess their views on these concepts of juvenile transfer and the
role of the juvenile court.

Support for Transfer and the Separate Juvenile Court
The first research question examined was to what extent do prosecutors
support the option of transfer generally.

Almost ninety-five percent of the

respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this criminal justice option.
The second research question examined the extent to which prosecutors
would favor abolishing the juvenile court, maintaining it as is with some youths
being excluded or handling all juveniles in the juvenile court. Nearly two-thirds of
the respondents strongly opposed the abolishing the juvenile court and most
others were somewhat opposed.

Less than five percent of the prosecutors

studied favored trying all juveniles in the adult criminal court. This did not mean,
however, that the respondents felt the juvenile court was right for all juvenile
defendants. Rather, prosecutors agreed that most juveniles should be handled
in the juvenile court, but that some juveniles should be transferred to the adult
court. The responses indicate a relatively conservative position by prosecutors
on the idea of transfer. While prosecutors are supportive of the idea of transfer
generally, this support seems to be contingent on the specific crime and juvenile
offender. Most wanted serious, violent youths to be handled by the adult court.
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In short, the results revealed here suggest that prosecutors' preferences are
largely consistent with current practices.

They favor neither of the extreme

positions that have been extended - complete abolishment of the juvenile court or
full retention of all juveniles in the juvenile justice system. Instead, prosecutors
support a system where some discretion can be exercised.

Arguments For and Against Transfer
The third research question examined the extent to which prosecutors
agreed or disagreed with the arguments found in the literature for and against
transfer. The majority of the arguments for transfer of juveniles to the adult court
received support from Florida prosecutors. However, prosecutors were more
reserved in their attitudes towards the arguments against transfer. The findings
suggest that while prosecutors support transfer in general, their support is
contingent upon the specific youth, criminal history, and nature of the current
offense. Further, responses to the arguments against transfer would suggest
that prosecutors are not as influenced by the items found in the arguments
against transfer.

Mechanisms of Transfer
The final research question examined the extent to which prosecutors
support or oppose the various mechanisms of transfer.

Not surprisingly, the

mechanism of transfer that received the strongest support was where
prosecutors alone make the transfer decision. Further, most prosecutors did not
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agree with any mechanism of juvenile transfer where the decision to transfer is
determined solely by the judiciary. Prosecutors did, however, give moderate
support to a mechanism of transfer in which prosecutors recommend transfer
and judges make the final decision.

Overview of Hypotheses Tests
Thirteen hypotheses were tested in this research. In order to test these
hypotheses, each prosecutor received a hypothetical case summary on a
juvenile offender. Prosecutors were then asked to rate or score the likelihood
that the current juvenile could be rehabilitated and the threat that the youth posed
to society. Finally, prosecutors were asked to provide the chance that they would
want to transfer that juvenile to the adult court.

The following presents the

summary of the level of support for each of the hypotheses tested in this
research.

Age of the Offender
Hypothesis 1 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be positively related to the youth's age.

A Pearson Correlation revealed a

significant difference between the age of the offender in the vignette and
prosecutorial preference for exclusion. Older juveniles were significantly more
likely to be recommended for transfer to the adult court (r = .266, p <.001). This
significant relationship was confirmed in regression analysis. The age of the
juvenile was one of the strongest predictors of prosecutorial preference for
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exclusion.

Based on the regression model prediction, the preference for

excluding a seventeen year old youth was nearly 22 percentage points higher
than for a twelve year old youth. The salience of the juvenile's age is consistent
with past research showing that people generally favor harsher handling of older
juveniles (Applegate & Davis, 2006; Moon, Wright, Cullen & Pealer, 2000; Vogel
& Vogel, 2003).

Maturity of Youth
Hypothesis 2 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be positively related to the perceived maturity of a youth.

A One-way ANOVA

was run to determine the relationship between maturity and likelihood of transfer.
Analysis revealed no significant relationship between the juvenile's maturity and
likelihood of transfer. Based on the bivariate analysis, maturity of youth was not
included in the regression analysis.

Likelihood of Rehabilitation
Hypothesis 3 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be negatively related to the perceived likelihood of rehabilitation. A Pearson
Correlation revealed a significant inverse relationship between these two
variables (r = .321, p<.001). That is, prosecutorial preference for exclusion was
significantly lower for those juveniles who were viewed as being more amenable
to rehabilitation. Similar results were seen in the regression analysis, where a
one-point increase on the likelihood of rehabilitation scale produced a nearly five-
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percentage point decrease in preference for transfer.

Notably, the use of

rehabilitation potential in decisions about transfer is consistent with legal
mandates (Kent v. US; Fla Stat. §985.226).

Presence of a Violent Offense
Hypothesis 4 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be positively related to the presence of a violent offense. A One-Way ANOVA
was run to determine the relationship between offense type and preference for
transfer.

This bivariate analysis indicated that offense type was significantly

related to prosecutorial preference for transfer (F = 7.613, p<.001). Post hoc
analysis revealed that preference for exclusion was significantly different for
cases in which the offense was a violent crime. Based on these analyses, this
variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable (1 = violent offense, 0 = nonviolent offense). This recoded variable was entered into the regression. Results
indicated a significant increase in preference for transfer when the juvenile was
accused of a violent offense.
These results indicate that prosecutorial preferences regarding what
offenses are most deserving of transfer to the adult court are more or less in line
with public views. Prior research has indicated that the public favors transfer of
juveniles that commit serious, violent crimes (Bouley & Wells, 2001; King-Davis
et al., 2003; Schwartz, 1992; and Wu, 2000).
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Severity of Offense
Hypothesis 5 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be positively related to the severity of the offense charged. In order to test this
hypothesis, a new dichotomous variable was created for offense severity (1 =
more severe, 0 = less severe).
regression analysis.

This new variable was entered into the

With all other variables in the regression model held

constant, severity of offense was not a significant predictor of prosecutorial
preference for exclusion. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was not supported by the data.

Threat to Society
Hypothesis 6 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be greater when the youth was perceived as a threat to society. A Pearson
Correlation was run to examine the relationship between these two variables.
Results indicated a significant, moderate relationship (r = .344, p<.001).
Prosecutorial preference for exclusion was significantly higher for those youths
that were perceived as being a greater threat to society. Further regression
analysis yielded similar results.

The threat to society was significant in the

regression model and explained nearly one-quarter of the variance in preference
for transfer. Prosecutors' personal preferences, therefore, support statutes and
case law that require consideration of dangerousness in making transfer
decisions (Kent v. US; Fla. Stat. §985.226).
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Prior Record of Adjudication
Hypothesis 7 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be greater for youth with a record of prior adjudications in the juvenile court.

A

One-Way Anova was run to examine the relationship between prior adjudications
and prosecutorial preference for transfer.

Analysis revealed a significant

relationship between prior offenses and transfer. Specifically, juveniles having
one or three prior adjudications were significantly more likely to be preferred for
transfer to the adult court compared to those with no priors. Further, juveniles
with three adjudications were significantly more likely than were juveniles with
one prior to be transferred to the adult court. To further examine the impact of
prior adjudications on prosecutorial preference for transfer, the present variable
was recoded into a continuous variable (0, 1, and 3 priors). Prior adjudications
was significant in the regression model, explaining approximately 15% of the
variance in preference for transfer.

Prior Commitment Record
Hypothesis 8 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be positively related to prior commitment to a residential facility. A t-test was
utilized to examine the bivariate relationship between prior commitments and
preference for transfer to the adult court.

Results indicated a significant

difference for prosecutorial preference for transfer for juveniles with a history of
one prior commitment to a residential facility (p<.019). Yet, when controlling for
all other variables in the regression, prior commitments was not significant in

138

explaining the variance in the dependent variable. Thus, Hypothesis 8 was not
supported.

Family Support
Hypothesis 9 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be greater for youths whose families were not supportive than for youths with
supportive families. A t-test revealed no significant relationship between family
support and preference for transfer to the adult court.

It should be noted,

however, that as discussed in Chapter 4, prosecutors often mentioned other
family issues as important considerations in transfer. For example, prosecutors
wanted additional information on criminal history on family members.

Ethnicity
Hypothesis 10 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be greater for minority youth than for non-minority youth. A One-Way ANOVA
was run to examine the relationship between ethnicity and preference for
transfer.

Analysis revealed a significant relationship between ethnicity and

prosecutorial preference for transfer. However, post-hoc analysis revealed that
this significant relationship did not apply to all minorities. Preference for transfer
was higher for Hispanic juveniles, but was not significantly difference between
black and white youths. Based on the bivariate analysis, ethnicity was recoded
into a dichotomous variable for entry into the multiple regression (1 = Hispanic, 0
= Non-Hispanic). Ethnicity was significant in the regression model, where, net of
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the other characteristics in the model, being Hispanic increased preference for
transfer by more than nine percentage points.
partially supported.

Thus, the hypothesis is only

The condition of being a minority was not uniformly

significant, but the condition of being Hispanic was supported.

Gender
Hypothesis 11 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be greater for male youth than for female youth. A t-test was run to examine this
relationship. Analysis indicated no significant relationship between gender and
prosecutorial preference for transfer. Thus, gender is not a significant predictor
of preference for exclusion.

History of Family Abuse
Hypothesis 12 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be greater for youth that have not been abused than for those who have. A t-test
was run to examine the relationship between history of abuse by a family
member and prosecutorial preference for transfer. While analysis revealed no
significant relationship between abuse and preference for transfer, prosecutors
often indicated a desire to have more information where history of abuse was
present. For example, respondents often wanted to know greater detail on the
duration and nature of the abuse. Thus, while the hypothesis was not supported,
some prosecutors' open-ended responses indicated that this might contribute to

140

the overall decision to seek more individualized treatment options in the juvenile
court.

Socio-Economic Status
Hypothesis 13 predicted that prosecutorial preference for exclusion would
be negatively related to socio-economic status. One-Way ANOVA indicated that
while the mean of preference for transfer was lower for upper-income juveniles,
this relationship was not significantly different. Thus, Hypothesis 13 was not
supported by the data.

Policy Implications and Recommendations
Based on the findings of the current research several important areas of
juvenile transfer policy must be considered.

As addressed in Chapter 2,

prosecutors have a great deal of discretion in juvenile transfer. They ultimately
have the authority to determine the charges for which the juvenile will stand trial
and, as provided in Florida statutes, have considerable discretion in determining
the court of jurisdiction for this criminal process. Because of this power, it is
imperative to gain a better understanding of prosecutors' views on the role of the
juvenile court as well as the process of juvenile transfer. The research questions
in this dissertation were designed to better understand their perspectives.
Generally, prosecutors support the idea of transfer of juveniles to the adult court.
However, their responses to the items addressing the research questions yield
several important policy considerations.
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First, prosecutors appear to support transfer in isolated circumstances.
Prosecutors seem to be somewhat restrained in their support for transfer,
supporting transfer in those isolated circumstances where the juvenile's criminal
history or current offense warrants this process. This restraint may be fueled by
the recognition that transfer to the adult court can have significant consequences
for the transferred juvenile. Further, they disagreed with the notion of abolishing
the juvenile court, indicating their recognition of the value of this separate court.
Second, and not surprisingly, prosecutors strongly support prosecutorial direct
file as a mechanism of transfer. However, they also support a process by which
prosecutors make a recommendation for transfer and judges make the final
determination. These responses also indicate some deal of restraint on their
discretionary power to transfer a juvenile to the adult court.
The vignette portion of the survey also yielded some important policy
considerations. The preference for transfer to the adult court (M = 22.11) was
consistent with the responses to the items addressing the research questions.
That is, most prosecutors were quite conservative in their estimates of the
chance that they would want to transfer the youth described in the vignette. Most
important in these decisions were the age of the youth, the potential threat to
society, and the presence of a violent offense. The fact that the age of the youth
was a significant predictor in the preference for transfer may reflect two
considerations. First, prosecutors may attribute other characteristics to a youth
when reading the age. For example, an older youth may be associated with
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greater maturity27, greater accountability, or greater criminal sophistication. The
long-standing justification for a separate juvenile justice system is the relative
immaturity and diminished culpability of most juveniles (Bernard, 1992). Second,
the results reported here may reflect Bishop et al.'s (1989) finding that
prosecutors prefer to transfer older juveniles because they realize such youths
will soon age out of the juvenile court jurisdiction. Transfer to the adult system
may allow for much longer terms of supervision by justice agencies.
Most troubling in the results is the role of ethnicity in the preference for
transfer.

Ethnicity explained fifteen percent of the variance in prosecutorial

preference for transfer.

Hispanic youths were significantly more likely to be

preferred for transfer than were whites or blacks.

These findings are not

consistent with Florida's rate of waiver of youth by race presented in Chapter 2.
The Florida data revealed that blacks, at a rate of nearly 3.5%, are more likely to
be transferred to the adult court than whites. Further, the Florida data revealed
that all other ethnicities (Asian and Other) are more likely to be transferred. Prior
research has generated similar findings to Florida's data (Barnes & Franz, 1989;
Podkopacz & Feld, 1995; Puzzanchera, 2000; Snyder et al., 2000; Thomas &
Bilichick, 1985). However, not all prior research has isolated the ethnic effect on
transfer, but rather the effect of race with Hispanics being categorized as white.
The current research did test the effect of ethnicity and found a significant
relationship to transfer preference. This relationship to preference for transfer is

27

While the maturity of the juvenile was not a significant predictor of preference for transfer, the
initial bivariate test did approach significance (F=2.343, p=.100).
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particularly important due to the large Hispanic population in Florida.

This

disparity in preference for transfer needs to be further explored.
Based on the findings, this research would make the following
recommendations. First, the juvenile justice system should be maintained as it
is, with most juvenile offenders being handled in the juvenile court and relatively
few juvenile offenders being transferred to the adult court. All of the juveniles
described in the vignettes were eligible under Florida law to be excluded from the
juvenile court. Notably, however, the overall likelihood of transfer in the current
study was 22%, suggesting that prosecutors seem to view exclusion as the
appropriate response in only some cases. Moreover, they appeared to make
rational decisions, removing the most serious, dangerous, and least likely to be
rehabilitated offenders from the juvenile court. This approach helps preserve the
nature of juvenile justice for the remainder of juvenile offenders. Further, there
were no significant differences in prosecutorial preference for transfer by
prosecutor characteristics, suggesting that there are no "camps" into which
prosecutors are divided.
Second, the current structuring of prosecutorial discretion for juvenile
transfer should remain. With the exception of ethnicity, decisions are based on
appropriate, legal criteria.

This suggests that, mostly, there is a legitimate

foundation for the preference to transfer. However, further research must be
conducted to gain a better understanding of the role that ethnicity plays in the
process of juvenile transfer to the adult court.
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Limitations of Current Research
There are limitations to the current research that must be acknowledged
when considering the findings and policy implications. First, the policy issues
discussed are based solely on the observations of 272 State Attorneys and
Assistant State Attorneys in Florida.

Unique characteristics of Florida

prosecutors as well as Florida law regarding transfer may limit the generalizability
of the findings to prosecutors in other states.
Second, nonresponse error may have occurred.

There were three

instances where a large portion of an entire judicial district's prosecutors did not
respond to the survey.

While the pre-notice letter was intended to foster a

mutual relationship between the researcher and State Attorney, as well as detail
the importance of the current study, the reaction to the letter may have been
counter-productive. In one judicial district, upon receiving the pre-notice letter,
the State Attorney instructed prosecutors not to respond to the survey until he
had time to review it. Unfortunately, all of the surveys were returned with a letter
indicating that none of the prosecutors would be completing the survey.
While the initial phase of the study yielded a modest response rate,
prosecutors informed me during the second phase that they had been instructed
by their superiors not to complete and return the survey. In addition, several
prosecutors contacted this researcher to indicate a general loathing of social
science research in the juvenile justice field as well as to express suspicion for
the current research goals. In these instances, the prosecutors were convinced
of some sort of bias by this researcher against prosecutors and juvenile transfer.
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While assured that this was not the case, many of these prosecutors could not be
convinced of the value of their responses and the ultimate contribution of their
efforts.
Finally, some prosecutors indicated that it would not be appropriate for
them to complete the survey instrument. This group of non-respondents believed
that they work at the pleasure of the State Attorney and should not express their
own opinions, as they might be inconsistent with their State Attorney.
Unfortunately, the prosecutors described above may be important and
different from those who responded to the survey, particularly if they make
juvenile transfer decisions.
One final limitation concerns the survey instrument. Based on the openended questions, some additional, contextual detail could have provided greater
insight into the factors that affect the decision to transfer juveniles to the adult
court.

Specifically, greater vignette detail regarding the nature of the prior

offenses and the nature of the current offense were continually cited as being
influential. Unfortunately, while this information was said to be important by
prosecutors, the impact of this additional information is unknown.

Future Research
This research was implemented to gain a better understanding of the
factors affecting the decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult court and
prosecutors views on transfer. Based on the findings, it is recommended that
several areas of future research be explored.

146

First, this research should be

replicated in different states. Looking at data from other states, with laws similar
to Florida's laws, may yield important information. Specifically, replication may
provide greater insight on the issue of race. Second, additional research should
be conducted utilizing an updated survey instrument.

Specifically, additional

information should be provided to prosecutors on the nature of the prior offenses
as well as changes to the maturity variable. Further, each prosecutor should
receive three vignettes - one for each offense category (violent crime, property
crime, and drug crime. The current research indicated that the presence of a
violent offense was a significant predictor of transfer preference. However, this
finding is not consistent with what we know about Florida's rate of transfer by
crime category. Drug offenses yielded a higher rate of transfer than did violent
offenses as described in Chapter 2.

Having prosecutors respond to three

vignettes, each involving a different type of offense, would allow for examination
of whether other factors differentially affect preferences for transfer within each
crime type.
Finally, qualitative research should be employed to provide greater detail
to the process of transfer of juvenile offenders to the adult court. Two methods
are most appropriate. First, semi-structured interviews should be conducted with
prosecutors in Florida who currently work in their respective Juvenile Divisions.
This method would provide greater insight into how discretion is exercised and
why the decisions are made. Prosecutors in the current study often indicated
that the ultimate sentence or disposition possibilities for juveniles would be a
critical factor in their decisions to transfer to the adult court. Interviews would
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provide the forum to better understand the degree to which this issue, among
other known predictors, contributes to the transfer process.

Further, these

interviews would allow the researcher to ask for greater details on issues of the
process of transfer. Specifically, the researcher would be able to identify other
social and political factors that may influence the prosecutors' decisions. Finally,
these interviews would allow the researcher to further clarify who is making the
transfer decision.
The second qualitative research approach is far less intrusive. The use of
social artifacts could be an invaluable tool in better understanding transfer of
juvenile offenders to the adult court.

While state data provides quantitative

information on the juveniles being transferred, accessing the casefiles of
transferred juveniles could potentially provide other contextually important
information that is not provided by the state or that can not be captured in a
survey.

Conclusion
Discretion is a critical component of the criminal justice system.
Throughout the system discretion is utilized by gatekeepers to ensure the
continual criminal justice process. Without it, the system would be overtaxed and
fail to function. This dissertation provides a modest empirical contribution to the
area of juvenile transfer research. Specifically, this research contributes to our
understanding of the factors affecting transfer of youth to the adult court as well
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as a better perspective of the attitudes of prosecutors upon whose discretion we
rely.
The hypotheses tests reveal that prosecutors are greatly influenced by the
juvenile offender as well as the offense in making transfer decisions. These
findings are consistent with their responses to the research question items,
indicating that while transfer is viewed as an important criminal justice
component, it should be used sparingly. At least from prosecutors, the future of
the juvenile court is safe.
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PRENOTICE LETTER
June XX, 2004
State Attorney Name
State Attorneys Office
Nth Judicial District
City, State 30000
Dear State Attorney Name:
A few days from now, prosecutors within your judicial district will receive in the mail a request to
fill out a brief questionnaire for an important research project being conducted by the University of
Central Florida. These prosecutors were randomly selected from a list of Florida's State
Attorneys and Assistant State Attorneys.
This questionnaire concerns the certification of juveniles to the adult court and the role of the
juvenile court in Florida. We are asking prosecutors for their opinions regarding these issues.
I am writing in advance because I am sure that you would like to be notified ahead of time of the
correspondence between us and your attorneys. I am also writing in advance to ask you to
support your prosecutors' participation in this study. Their intimate knowledge of the judicial
system is invaluable. This is the first study to try to understand the certification process from the
perspective of prosecutors.
Once this study has been completed, we will send you a copy of our findings, and we hope that
you will share them with others who may be interested.
It is only with the help of you and your office that our research can be successful. Thank you for
your time and consideration.
Sincerely,

Robin King Davis
Project Director

151

COVER LETTER #1

June XX, 2004
Dear Mr. _________ or Ms. ___________:
I am writing to ask for your help in a study being conducted by the University of Central Florida.
You were one of several hundred state attorneys randomly selected to be included in this study.
The objective of our study is to understand the process of certification of juveniles to the adult
criminal justice system from the prosecutor's perspective. Regardless of your current position in
the State Attorney's Office, we are asking for your participation. As a prosecutor in Florida, you
have invaluable knowledge and insight into this issue.
Please fill out the enclosed questionnaire. Your answers are completely confidential and
demographic information will be used for statistical purposes only. Also included is a selfaddressed stamped envelope for your convenience once you have completed the survey. When
you return your questionnaire, your name will be deleted from our mailing list and database and
will not be connected to your responses in any way. Participation in this study is completely
voluntary. However, I would like to stress the importance of your participation in this study. While
previous studies have looked to rates of certification as a means to explain juvenile transfer, no
study has surveyed state attorneys to understand their unique perspective and experience
regarding this issue. If for some reason you choose not to participate in this study, please let me
know by returning the blank questionnaire in the enclosed stamped envelope.
If you have any questions or comments about this study, I would be happy to speak with you. I
can be reached at the address on this letterhead, by telephone at (407) 823-3739, or by e-mail at
ro770882@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu.
Thank you for your participation and time.
Sincerely,

Robin King Davis
Project Director
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THANK YOU/REMINDER POST CARD
Last week we mailed you Florida State Attorney Survey, seeking your views about the juvenile
court and certification of youthful offenders. Your response is very important to us.
If you have already completed and returned the survey to us, please accept our sincere thanks. If
not, please do so today. Participation in this study is voluntary, but because we sent the
questionnaire to only a small but representative sample of State Attorneys, it is extremely
important that you also be included in the study if the results are to accurately represent the views
of prosecutors in Florida.
If by some chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it got misplaced, please call right now
(407-823-3739) and I will get another one in the mail to you immediately.
Sincerely,

Robin King Davis
Project Director
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COVER LETTER #2

June xx, 2004
Dear Mr. ________ or Ms. ________:
About three weeks ago, I sent a questionnaire to you that asked for your views on the juvenile
court and certification of youthful offenders. To the best of our knowledge it has not yet been
returned.
The comments of the State Attorneys who have already responded include a wide variety of
opinions about the juvenile court and certification of youthful offenders. We think the results will
be useful to practitioners and researchers.
We are writing again because of the importance that your own views have for helping us to get
accurate results. Although we sent questionnaires to prosecutors throughout the state, it's only
by hearing from nearly everyone in the sample that we can be sure the results truly represent
Florida State Attorneys.
A few prosecutors have contacted us to say that they should not have received the survey
because they do not currently work in a position where they have any role in juvenile court or
juvenile certification. As we have told them, this survey hopes to collect the opinions of all types
of prosecutors - experienced and newer prosecutors, male and female, felony and misdemeanor
attorneys, and those who play a role in certification as well as those who do not.
As we noted in our first letter, participation in this study is completely voluntary and greatly
appreciated. To assure your privacy is maintained, a code number is written on the enclosed
return envelope so that we may remove your name from our mailing list when you send back your
survey. To protect your privacy, your name only appears on our mailing list and will not be
associated with your answers in any way. In other words, you can be assured that your
responses will be completely confidential.
Your views are very important to us. We hope that you will fill out and return the questionnaire
soon. If you have any concerns or difficulties completing the survey, please call me at (407) 8233739. If I am not in the office, please leave a message and I will return your call. Thank you
again for taking your time to participate in our survey.
Sincerely,

Robin King Davis, M.CJ.
Project Director
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FINALCONTACT POST CARD
Recently, we mailed you the Statewide Survey of Florida State Attorneys,
seeking your views about the juvenile court and certification of youthful offenders.
We are getting close to ending our data collection efforts and have yet to receive
your completed survey.
We would greatly appreciate your participation in our research. If you would like
another copy of the survey, please call (407-823-3739) or e-mail
(ro770882@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu) me, and I will get another survey to you in the
mail immediately. Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,

Robin King Davis
Project Director
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Youthful Offenders in Court

Statewide Survey of Florida
State Attorneys

by the
University of Central Florida

______________________________________________________________________________________
____
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Please return completed surveys to:
Robin King Davis, Director of Survey Projects
University of Central Florida, Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies, PO Box 161600, Orlando,
FL 32816
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STRONGLY
AGREE

NEUTRAL

All youthful offenders age 17 and under should be adjudicated
in a separate juvenile court, not in the adult court

1

2

3

4

5

Most juvenile offenders should stay under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court

1

2

3

4

5

3.

In general, I support certifying some youths to the adult court

1

2

3

4

5

4.

Serious, violent youthful offenders should be certified to the adult court

1

2

3

4

5

5.

Certain juvenile offenders' sentences should continue in the adult
criminal justice system after the youth reaches the age of majority

1

2

3

4

5

6.

The juvenile court should be abolished

1

2

3

4

5

7.

If a youth is tried in the adult court, his or her age should be used
as a mitigating factor in sentencing decisions

1

2

3

4

5

Some youths are beyond the rehabilitation capacities of the
juvenile justice system

1

2

3

4

5

For the protection of society, it is necessary to certify some youths
to the adult court

1

2

3

4

5

10. Some offenses are serious enough to warrant certification
to the adult court

1

2

3

4

5

11. Resources in the juvenile justice system are too scarce to warrant
spending them on youthful offenders who are chronically delinquent

1

2

3

4

5

12. Certifying certain youths to the adult court will deter other
juveniles from committing crime

1

2

3

4

5

13. Serious juvenile offenders have a significant negative influence on
other youth in the juvenile justice system

1

2

3

4

5

14. Chronic juvenile offenders have a significant negative influence
on other youth in the juvenile justice system

1

2

3

4

5

15. Protection of due process rights for juvenile offenders is more
certain in the adult court

1

2

3

4

5

Please indicate your response by
circling your choice.

1.

2.

8.

9.

AGREE

DISAGREE

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

PART I. We would like to begin by asking by asking for your thoughts about the role of the juvenile court.
Below are several statements about the appropriate role and domain of the juvenile court. Some state
attorneys would agree with them. Others would disagree. We would like to know what you think about the
juvenile court.

please continue on the back of this page °
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STRONGLY
AGREE

NEUTRAL

1

2

3

4

5

17. Transferring youths to the adult court may jeopardize their futures
by having a criminal rather than a sealed record

1

2

3

4

5

18. Juvenile offenders should not be exposed to adult offenders

1

2

3

4

5

19. Juvenile offenders can not get the proper treatment and rehabilitative
services they need in the adult system

1

2

3

4

5

20. Juvenile offenders can be influenced to change easier than
adult offenders

1

2

3

4

5

21. Juvenile offenders do not need the same due process protections
as adult offenders because the juvenile justice system is not adversarial

1

2

3

4

5

22. Juvenile offenders are less responsible for their actions than
adult offenders

1

2

3

4

5

23. Juvenile offenders are less mature than adult offenders

1

2

3

4

5

24. Judges alone should be responsible for making certification decisions

1

2

3

4

5

25. Prosecutors alone should be responsible for making certification decisions

1

2

3

4

5

26. Prosecutors should make the certification recommendation, but judges
should make the final certification decision

1

2

3

4

5

27. Judicial waiver promotes protections of youths' due process rights

1

2

3

4

5

28. Legislative certification takes away the subjective quality of certification

1

2

3

4

5

29. Judges are inconsistent in their certification decisions

1

2

3

4

5

30. Judicial waiver is too subjective

1

2

3

4

5

31. Judges are too hesitant to waive appropriate candidates for certification

1

2

3

4

5

32. Prosecutorial waiver is influenced by political decisions

1

2

3

4

5

33. Prosecutorial waiver leads to abuse of power

1

2

3

4

5

34. Statutory exclusions are too automatic

1

2

3

4

5

AGREE

DISAGREE

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

16. Juvenile offenders get more individualized attention in the juvenile
court compared to the adult court

please continue on the next page Ö
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PART II. We are nearly at the end of this survey, but would like to get your views on a specific case.
Please read the following offender and offense description and answer the questions below.
OFFENDER-OFFENSE DESCRIPTION SHEET 428
GENDER:

Male

AGE:

16

ETHNICITY: Hispanic

CURRENT OFFENSE:
> The youth is accused of threatening to beat up a young girl unless she
gave up her money. The victim gave up $20 and was not physically harmed
DELINQUENT HISTORY:
> No prior adjudications in the juvenile court
> No prior commitments to a state facility
SOCIAL HISTORY:
> No prior history of abuse by family members
> Middle-income family
> Family appears willing to participate in any special requirements imposed
by the court
> Youth is more mature than same-age peers

STRONGLY
AGREE

NEUTRAL

35. Given the proper care and treatment, this youth can change for the better

1

2

3

4

5

36. This youth poses a significant threat to society

1

2

3

4

5

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with
the following two statements.

37.

AGREE

DISAGREE

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

Regardless of your current position or experience within the State Attorney's Office, we would like to know
your opinion regarding the present offender and offense.

Regardless of what the law currently allows, we would like to know
your own views on the best way to handle this juvenile's case.
Based on the information provided, what are the chances that you
would want to certify this youth to the adult court?

%
0% means the youth would stay in
the juvenile court, and 100% means
the youth would go to the adult
court. You can also choose any
number in between.

38.

What, if any, other information would help you decide whether this youth should be certified to the
adult court?

please continue on the back of this page °
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PART III. Finally, we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself that will help us to interpret the
results. We will use this information only to group you with others who are like you to see whether your
answers are similar. This information will not be used to identify any individual respondent.
39. How old are you? __________
40. What race are you? (check one)




White
Black
Hispanic





Asian or Pacific Islander
American Indian
Other

41. What is your gender? (check one)



Male
Female

42. In what division of the State Attorney's Office do you currently work? (check one)




Felony
Misdemeanor
Other

43. Have you ever been involved in making a decision to certify a youth to the adult court? (check one)



Yes
No

44. To the best of your recollection, how many years and months have you been a prosecutor?
Years ___________ Months ___________

To the best of your knowledge does your jurisdiction currently have a written policy that provides

45.

specific guidelines regarding which juveniles should be certified to the adult court? (check one)




Yes
No
I don’t know

Do you believe your jurisdiction needs a written policy specifying which
juveniles should be certified to the adult court? (check one)





No
Yes, developed by the state attorney’s office
Yes, developed by the judiciary
Yes, developed by ______________________

_____________________________________________________________________________
Thank you for participating in this study.
Should you have any additional comments that you feel are important to better understanding certification to the adult
court, please detail them on the back of the cover page or on a separate sheet.

162

APPENDIX C: IRB APPROVAL

163

164

LIST OF REFERENCES

Allen, F.A. (2000). Forward. In J. Fagan and F.E. Zimring (eds.),
The changing borders of juvenile justice: Transfer of
adolescents to the criminal court (pp. ix-xvi). Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
American Prosecutors Research Institute. (1996). Prosecutors’ policy
recommendations on serious, violent, and habitual youthful
offenders. Alexandria, VA: American Prosecutors Research Institute.
Applegate, B.K. & Davis, R.K. (2006). Public views on sentencing juvenile
murderers: The impact of offense, offender, and perceived maturity. Youth
Violence and Juvenile Justice, 4, 55-74.
Applegate, B.K., Turner, M.G., Sanborn Jr., J.B., Latessa, E.J., and Moon,
M.M. (2000). Individualization, criminalization, or problem resolution:
A factorial survey of juvenile court judges’ decisions to incarcerate
youthful felony offenders. Justice Quarterly, 17(2), 309-331.
Arthur, L.G. (1998). Abolish the juvenile court? Juvenile and Family
Court Journal, 49(1), 51-58.
Bazemore, G., and Feder, L. (1997). Rehabilitation in the new juvenile court:
Do judges support the treatment ethic? American Journal of Criminal
Justice, 21(2), 181-212.
Bernard, T.J. (1992). The cycle of juvenile justice. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.

165

Bernard, T.J. (1997). Juvenile crime and the transformation of juvenile
justice: Is there a juvenile crime wave? Justice Quarterly, 16(2),
337-356.
Binder, A., Geis, G., and Bruce, Jr., D.D. (1997). Juvenile delinquency:
Historical, cultural and legal perspectives. Cincinnati, OH:
Anderson.
Bishop, D.M. (2000). Juvenile offenders in the adult criminal justice system.
In M. Tonry (ed.), Crime and justice: A review of research (pp. 81167). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Bishop, D.M., and Frazier, C.E. (1991). Transfer of juveniles to criminal court:
A case study and analysis of prosecutorial waiver. Notre Dame Journal
of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 5, 281-302.
Bishop, D.M., Frazier, C.E., and Henretta, J.C. (1989). Prosecutorial waiver:
Case study of a questionable reform. Crime & Delinquency, 35,
179-189.
Bishop, D.M., Frazier, C.E., Lanza-Kaduce, L., and White, H.G. (1999).
A study of juvenile transfers to criminal court in Florida. OJJDP
fact sheet, August #113.
Bortner, M.A. (1986). Traditional rhetoric, organization realities: Remand
of juveniles to adult court. Crime & Delinquency, 32, 53-73.
Bortner, M.A., Marjorie, S.Z., and Darnell, F.H. (2000). Race and transfer:
Emprical research and social context. In J. Fagan and F.E. Zimring
(eds.), The changing borders of juvenile justice: Transfer of

166

adolescents to the criminal court (pp. 277-320). Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Bouley, Jr., E.E., and Wells, T.L. (2001). Attitudes of citizens in a southern
rural county toward juvenile crime and justice issues. Journal of
Contemporary Criminal Justice, 17, 60-70.
Butts, J.A., and Harrell, A.V. (1998, June). Delinquents or criminals: Policy
options for young offenders. Crime policy report. Washington, DC: The
Urban Institute.
Cullen, F.T., Golden, K.M., and Cullen, J.B. (1983). Is child saving dead?
Attitudes toward juvenile rehabilitation in Illinois. Journal of Criminal
Justice, 11, 1-13.
Davis, K.C. (1969). Discretionary justice: A preliminary inquiry. Chicago, IL:
University of Illinois Press.
Dawson, R.O. (2000). Judicial waiver in theory and practice. In J. Fagan and
F.E. Zimring (eds.), The changing borders of juvenile justice: Transfer of
adolescents to the criminal court (pp. 45-81). Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Dillman. D.A. (2000). Mail and Internet surveys: The tailored design method
(2nd ed.). New York, NY: Wiley.
Fagan, J.A., Forst, M., and Vivona, T.S. (1987). Racial determinants of
the judicial transfer decision: Prosecuting violent youth in criminal
court. Crime & Delinquency, 33, 259-286.
Feld, B.C. (1993). Juvenile (in)justice and the criminal court alternative.

167

Crime & Delinquency, 39, 403-424.
Feld, B.C. (1997). Abolish the juvenile court: Youthfulness, criminal
responsibility, and sentencing policy. Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 88, 68-136.
Feld, B.C. (1998). Juvenile and criminal justice systems’ responses
to youth violence. In M. Tonry and M.H. Moore (eds.), Youth
violence (pp. 189-261). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Feld, B.C. (1999). Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile
Court. New York, NY: Oxford Press.
Fla. Stat. § 985.226
Fla. Stat. § 985.227
Finckenauer, J.O. (1984). Juvenile delinquency and corrections: The
gap between theory and practice. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Frazier, C.E., Bishop, D.M., and Lanza-Kaduce, L. (1999). Get-tough
juvenile justice reforms: The Florida experience. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 564, 167-184.
Gardner, M. R. (1995). Punitive juvenile justice: Some observations on a
recent trend. In M. L. Forst (ed.), The new juvenile justice (pp.
103-114). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
Grisso, T. (2000). What we know about youths’ capacities as trial defendants. In
T. Grisso and R. G. Schwartz (eds.), Youth on trial (pp. 139-171).
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

168

Hodson, T.M. (1999). The effect of race on the decision to try a juvenile as
an adult. Journal of Juvenile Law, 20, 82-107.
Howell, J.C. (1998). NCCD’s survey of juvenile detention and correctional
Facilities. Crime & Delinquency, 44(1), 102-109.
In re Gault. (387 U.S. 1)
In re Winship. (397 U.S. 358)
Jacoby, J.E. (1997). The American prosecutor’s discretionary power.
Prosecutor, 31(6), 25-40.
Kent v. United States. (383 U.S. 541)
Kinder, K., Veneziano, C., Fichter, M, and Azuma, H. (1995). A comparison
of the dispositions of juvenile offenders certified as adults with
juvenile offenders not certified. Juvenile and Family Court Journal, 46,
37-52.
King-Davis, R., Applegate, B.K., and Cullen, F.T. (2003). Public views of
juvenile exclusion: A factorial survey approach. Paper presented at the
annual meetings of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Boston,
MA.
Klein, E.K. (1998). Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid? An analysis of the
role of transfer to criminal court in juvenile justice. American Criminal
Law Review, 35, 371-410.
Mahoney, A.R. (1987). Juvenile justice in context. Boston, MA: Northeastern
Press.
McCoy, C. (1998). Prosecution. In M. Tonry (ed.), The handbook of crime

169

and punishment (pp. 457-473). Chicago, IL: Oxford University Press.
McNulty, E.W. (1996). The transfer of juvenile offenders to adult court:
Panacea or problem? Law & Policy, 18, 61-75.
Mears, D.P. (2001). Getting tough with juvenile offenders: Explaining support
for sanctioning youths as adults. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 28(2),
206-226.
Merlo, A.V. (2000). Juvenile justice at the crossroads: Presidential address
to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. Justice Quarterly, 17,
639-661.
Merlo, A.V., Benekos, P.J., and Cook, W.J. (1999). The juvenile court at 100
years: Celebration or wake? Juvenile and Family Court Journal, 50(3),
1-10.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. (403 U.S. 528)
Moon, M.M., Sundt, J.L., Cullen, F.T., and Wright, J.P. (2000). Is child saving
dead? Public support for juvenile rehabilitation. Crime & Delinquency,
46, 38-60.
Moon, M.M., Wright, J.P., Cullen, F.T., and Pealer, J.A. (2000). Putting kids
to death: Specifying public support for juvenile capital punishment.
Justice Quarterly, 17, 663-683.
National Research Council and Institute of Medicine. (2001). The juvenile
justice system. In J. McCord, C. S. Widom, and N.A. Crowell (Eds.),
Juvenile crime, juvenile justice. Panel on juvenile crime: Prevention,
treatment, and control. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

170

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. (1999). Juvenile justice:
A century of change. 1999 national report series: Juvenile justice
bulletin. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
Platt, A.M. (1969). The child savers: The invention of delinquency. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Podkopacz, M.R., and Feld, B.C. (1995). Judicial waiver policy and practice:
Persistence, seriousness, and race. Law and Inequality: A Journal of
Theory and Practice, 14, 73-178.
Podkopacz, M.R., and Feld, B.C. (1996). The end of the line: An empirical
study of judicial waiver. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 86,
449-492.
Poulos, T.M., and Orchowsky, S. (1994). Serious juvenile offenders: Predicting
the probability of transfer to criminal court. Crime & Delinquency, 40,
3-17.
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.
(1967a). The challenge of crime in a free society. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.
(1967b). Task force report: Juvenile delinquency and youth crime.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Puzzanchera, C.M. (2000). Delinquency cases waived to criminal court,
1988-1997. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention.

171

Puzzanchera, C.M. (20001). Delinquency cases waived to criminal court,
1989-1998. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention.
Redding, R.E. (1999). Legal, psychological, and behavioral outcomes.
Juvenile and Family Court Journal, 50, 1-19.
Rosenberg, I.M. (1993). Leaving bad enough alone: A response to the
juvenile court abolitionists. Wisconsin Law Review, 1993(1), 163-185.
Sanborn, J.B., Jr. (1994a). Remnants of parens patriae in the adjudicatory
hearing: Is a fair trial possible in juvenile court? Crime & Delinquency,
40, 599-616.
Sanborn, J.B., Jr. (1994b). Certification to criminal court: The important policy
questions of how, when and why. Crime & Delinquency, 40, 262-281.
Sanborn, J.B., Jr. (1995). How parents can affect the processing of delinquents
in the juvenile court. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 7, 1-26.
Sanborn, J.B., Jr. (1996). Factors perceived to affect delinquent dispositions in
juvenile court: Putting the sentencing decision into context. Crime &
Delinquency, 42, 99-113.
Schiraldi, V. (1999, March 22). Prosecutorial zeal vs. America’s kids. Christian
Science Monitor, 9.
Schiraldi, V., and Soler, M. (1998). The will of the people? The public’s opinion
of the Violent and Repeat Offender Act of 1997. Crime & Delinquency,
44, 590-601.
Schiraldi, V., and Ziedenberg, J. (2000). The Florida experiment: An analysis

172

of the impact of granting prosecutors discretion to try juveniles as
adults. San Francisco, CA: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice.
Snyder, H.N., Sickmund, M., and Poe-Yamagata, E. (2000). Juvenile transfers
to criminal court in the 1990s: Lessons learned from four studies.
Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
Sprott, J.B. (1998). Understanding public opposition to a separate youth
justice system. Crime & Delinquency, 44, 399-411.
Sprott, J.B. (1999). Are members of the public tough on crime? The dimensions
of public “punitiveness.” Journal of Criminal Justice, 27, 467-474.
State of Florida v. J.M., a child. Filed September 16, 1998.
Steinhart, D. (1988). California opinion poll: Public attitudes on youth crime.
Focus. San Francisco, CA: National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
Strom, K.J. (2000). Profile of state prisoners under age 18, 1985-1997.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Triplett, R. (1996). The growing threat: Gangs and juvenile offenders. In T.J.
Flanagan and D.R. Longmire (eds.), Americans view crime and justice:
A national public opinion survey (pp. 137-150). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Van Vleet, R.K. (1999). The attack on juvenile justice. Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 564, 203-214.
Vogel, B.L. & Vogel, R.E. (2003). The age of death: Appraising public opinion on
juvenile capital punishment. Journal of Criminal Justice, 31, 169-183.
Walker, S. (1993). Taming the system: The control of discretion in criminal

173

justice, 1950-1990. New York: Oxford University Press.
Warr, M. (1989). What is the perceived seriousness of crimes? Criminology,
27, 795-821.
Wu, B. (2000). Determinants of public opinion toward juvenile waiver decisions.
Juvenile and Family Court Journal, 51(1), 9-18.

174

